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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following 
is a complete list of all parties to the District Court proceedings that are the subject of this 
appeal, and their respective party designations in those proceedings: 
1. PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada 
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS OF NEVADA, a Nevada 
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS, a Nevada corporation; Plaintiff 
i 
2. K D A CORPORATION, a Utah corporation a/k/a KDA CORPORATION 
A/K/A K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a THE K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a 
K.D.A. CORPORATION PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation; 
Defendant 
3. PINE RIDGE PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation; Defendant 
4. UNITED WEST INVESTMENTS GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, a/k/a 
UNITED WAY INVESTMENTS GROUP; Defendant
 { 
5. S. DENISE HARDY; Defendant 
6. JOSEPH L. HARDY; Defendant 
7. SUMMIT ESCROW SERVICES, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
a/k/a SUMMIT EXCHANGE SERVICES, LLC, A Utah limited liability 
company; Defendant 
8. DALE RIDD; Defendant i 
iVLrtj^iri/\ t\iuu, ucicuumii 
10. MARCEL J. SCHWAGER; Defendant
 { 
11. SANDRA S. SCHWAGER; Defendant 
12. LYNN C. ANDERSEN, a/k/a LYNN L. ANDERSEN, a/k/a LYNN 
ANDERSEN, a/k/a LYNN C. ANDERSON, a/k/a LYNN L. ANDERSON, < 
a/k/a LYNN ANDERSON; Defendant 
i 
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13. ROBERT GONZALES; Defendant 
14. SHERI GONZALES; Defendant 
15. MICHAEL BUDD; Defendant 
16. TRUDI BUDD; Defendant 
17. HAROLD J. KAY; Defendant 
18. WILLIAM R. GLASER, a/k/a BILL GLASER; Defendant 
19. LAURIE A. GLASER; Defendant 
20. DONNA L. ELMQUIST, a/k/a DONNA L. ELMQUIST-SHILLCUTT; 
Defendant 
21. BRENT RHEES; Defendant 
22. GINGER RHEES; Defendant 
23. SHYREAL D. JENSEN; Defendant 
24. INGE L. JENSEN; Defendant 
25. JOHN D. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt 
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant 
26. LINDA L. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt 
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant 
27. THE JOHN D. SMIDT AND LINDA L. SMIDT REVOCABLE TRUST 
U/I/D OCTOBER 7, 1999; Defendant 
28. RANDALL HUNTER (deceased); Defendant 
29. RONALD HUNTER; Defendant 
30. KAY HUNTER; Defendant 
31. DANIEL HUNTER; Defendant 
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MARK B. HANCEY; Defendant 
33. HANCEY & ASSOCIATES, P.C, a Utah professional corporation; 
Defendant 
34. ROD W. CUSHING d/b/a ALLIANCE FINANCIAL, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; Defendant , 
35. MILES D. CRABTEE; Defendant 
36. SHERRY CRABTEE; Defendant 
i 
37. CLINT THOMPSON; Defendant 
38. CAROLYN THOMPSON; Defendant 
39. LARRY H. ANDERSEN, a/k/a LARRY A. ANDERSEN, a/k/a LARRY ( 
ANDERSEN; LARRY H. ANDERSON, LARRY A. ANDERSON, a/k/a 
LARRY ANDERSON; Defendant 
40. BILL BREINHOLT; Defendant
 ( 
41. SHAWN BREINHOLT; Defendant 
42. TERRY BEHUNIN; Defendant 
i 
43. TIMOTHY J. KENDELL; Defendant 
44. SCOTT HAYES; Defendant 
45. LENARD HANZLICK; Defendant i 
46. KATHRYN J. HANZLICK; Defendant 
47. BARRETT STEADMAN (deceased); Defendant < 
48. DOROTHY STEADMAN; Defendant 
49. DOUG PUGMIRE; Defendant 
i 
50. NORTNE PUGMIRE; Defendant 
i i i 
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51. GREGORY LARSEN; Defendant 
52. JERILYN LARSEN; Defendant 
53. GLADE LARSEN, a/k/a GLADE L. LARSEN; Defendant 
54. CORALIE LARSEN; Defendant 
55. RICHARD ROBERTS, a/k/a RICHARD D. ROBERTS; Defendant 
56. CAROL ROBERTS; Defendant 
57. BOYD SMITH, a/ka/ BOYD A. SMITH, as Trustee of The Boyd A. Smith 
and Carolyn G. Smith Family Trust; Defendant 
5 8. CAROLYN G. SMITH, as Trustee of The Boyd A. Smith and Carolyn G. 
Smith Family Trust; Defendant 
59. THE BOYD A. and CAROLYN G. SMITH FAMILY TRUST; Defendant 
60. LARRY CALL; Defendant 
61. KAREN CALL; Defendant 
62. HARLAN TAYLOR; Defendant 
63. RANAE TAYLOR; Defendant 
64. JOHN F. GUNN; Defendant 
65. BECKY CUTLER-GUNN; Defendant 
66. FIRST MAGNITUDE SERVICES, LLC, a Utah iimited liability company; 
Defendant 
67. FIRST MAGNITUDE FUND, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
Defendant 
68. JOHN L. WILLIAMSON; Defendant 
69. DAVE WARNICK; Defendant 
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DEWEY GARNER; Defendant 
71. JASON THOMPSON; Defendant 
72. GLADE W. DAVIS; Defendant 
73. OWEN BROWER; Defendant , 
74. STEVE G. BAUGH; Defendant 
75. THOR ROUNDY; Defendant 
i 
76. THOR ROUNDY, P.C., a Utah professional corporation; Defendant 
77. ADVANCE TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; Defendant 
78. RALPH CALL; Defendant 
79. RE/MAX IN THE VALLEY, INC., a Utah corporation, a/k/a RE/MAX IN 
THE VALLEY; Defendant
 { 
80. RE/MAX GREAT WEST BROKERS, PC, a Utah professional corporation; 
Defendant 
81. RE/MAX WEST, P.C., a Utah professional corporation, a/k/a RE/MAX I 
WEST; Defendant 
82. SIRIUS EQUITY, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Defendant 
83. PATSY MCMICHAEL; Defendant < 
84. ROBERT MCMICHAEL; Defendant 
85. SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah ^ 
corporation; Defendant 
86. NICTREE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partnership; 
Defendant 
i 
87. JOHN DOES I-XXX; and JANE DOES I-XXX; Defendants 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102 (2011). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPELLANTS9 APPEAL 
Appellant, Pioneer Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. ("Pioneer" or "Appellant"), 
specified five issues for appeal in its Statement of Issues. Appellees, Lynn C. Andersen, 
Larry Andersen, Bill Breinholt, Shauna Breinholt, Donna L. Elmquist, William R. Glaser, 
Laurie A. Glaser, Leonard Hanzlick, Kathryn Hanzlick, Scott Hayes, Ronald Hunter1, Kay 
Hunter, Estate of Randall Hunter, Harold J. Kay, Timothy J. Kendell, Glade Larsen, Coralie 
Larsen, Gregory Larsen, Nictree Limited Partnership, Dale Ridd, Marta Ridd, Richard 
Roberts, Carol Roberts, Marcel J. Schwager, Sandra S. Schwager, John D. Smidt as Trustee , 
Linda L. Smidt as Trustee, Dorothy Steadman, Sunrise Village Members' Association, Inc., 
Clint Thompson, and Carolyn Thompson (collectively "Andersen Defendants" ), object to 
1 Pioneer acknowledged it is not appealing the Trial Court's order that Ronald Hunter, 
Kay Hunter, and the Estate of Randall Hunter have priority in Lot 18, Parcel -025, over 
Pioneer's interests in said lot and parcel. (See Appellant's Addendum at Tab 8, f.n. 1). 
2 Pioneer acknowledged it is not appealing the Trial Court's order that John D. Smidt, as 
Trustee, and Linda L. Smidt, as Trustee, have priority in Lot 16, Parcel -025, over j 
Pioneer's interests in said lot and parcel. (See Appellant's Addendum at Tab 8, f.n. 2). 
3 At the Trial Court level, the "Andersen Defendants" also included Brent Rhees. However, 
the First District Court's Updated Order and Judgment of Priority and Foreclosure of 
Location Lots, entered December 16,2009, held "Pioneer is entitled to foreclose ... against i 
[Brent Rhees' Lot 51].. . and that such foreclosure and sale shall terminate and extinguish all 
rights, titles, and interests of... Brent Rhees" (R. at 5433.) This determination is not being 
1 
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Issue Nos. 4 and 5 insofar as they are inapplicable to the Andersen Defendants. Additionally, 
Pioneer raised issues that were not included in its Statement of Issues, including the title 
insurance and attorneys' fees issues. The Andersen Defendants object to these issues in that 
Pioneer did not include standards of review, supporting authority for the standards of review, 
and citations to the record showing these issues were preserved for appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following statute, set out verbatim with appropriate citation, is of central 
importance to the appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103 (2005): 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE RELEVANT TO ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from multiple summary judgment rulings entered by the First 
District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield presiding 
("Trial Court"). This action, as it relates to the Andersen Defendants, concerns an attempt by 
a lender, Pioneer, to take priority over and to foreclose against the Andersen Defendants' real 
appealed by Brent Rhees and/or the Andersen Defendants and therefore he has been removed 
as an Andersen Defendant for purposes of this Brief of Appellee, as he has no interest to 
protect through defending this appeal. The remaining Andersen Defendants were adjudicated 
at the Trial Court level to have priority over Pioneer's interests in the Property. This Brief of 
Appellee is limited to their protection. 
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property interests in and to various individual pads, lots, units, easements, rights of way, and 
other parts and interests in 40 acres of recreational property located near Bear Lake, in Rich ' 
County, Utah ("Property"). 
The Andersen Defendants all purchased their leasehold interests and rights of way in 
the Property prior to any Pioneer loans being made or Pioneer trust deeds being recorded. 
These leasehold interests (each individually described by a metes and bounds property 
description in their respective lease and right of way documents) gave rights in the Property 
to the purchasers for 100 years (broken into two 50-year leases and two 50-year grants of 
rights of way running consecutively). {See Andersen Defendants' Reply in Opposition to * 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment for Foreclosure and in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply 
Memorandum") at Exhibits 2-17, R. at 3259-3441.) A Lease, Right of Way Grant Deed, 
second 50-year Lease, and second 50-year Flight of Way Grant Deed, representative of each 
{ 
Andersen Defendants' separate leasehold interest, are attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 1. 
The various Andersen Defendants claim priority interests in nineteen different sites on 
the Property (hereinafter "Lots"). Each Lot is located either on Rich County Tax ID parcel I 
number 41-08-00-025 ("Parcel -025") or Rich County Tax ID parcel number 41-08-00-036 
("Parcel -03 6"), or partially on both. . 
Pioneer's attempted foreclosure against the Lots is based on a defaulted loan made by 
Pioneer on or about November 13, 2000. As security for this loan, Pioneer received a trust 
i 
deed that was recorded on November 17, 2000 ("First Pioneer Trust Deed"). The First 
3 
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Pioneer Trust Deed included Parcel -036 as security, but did not include Parcel -025. Of the 
Andersen Defendants' Lots, at least seventeen of the nineteen Lots are wholly or partially 
located on Parcel -025. (See Affidavit of Layne J. Smith, Exhibits "A"-"C", R. at 4784-4797 
(Exhibits in Packet No. 4798), and attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 2.) 
Almost one year later, Pioneer obtained a Modification of Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
(collectively "Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds"), which are the first matters of record 
purporting to include Parcel -025 as security. (R. at 3020-3038, Appellant's Addendum at 
Tabs 6-7.) The Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds were recorded on August 14, 2001. (Id.) 
However, at the date of recording, the Trustor, Pine Ridge Properties, Inc. ("Pine Ridge"), 
did not have record title to Parcel -025. (See Warranty Deed from KDA to Pine Ridge 
transferring title to Parcel -036 and others, but not transferring title to Parcel -025 to Pine 
Ridge, R. at 4178-4179, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 11.) Subsequent deeds and affidavits 
were recorded in an attempt to correct alleged errors and omissions contained in the 
Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds4 (all trust deeds recorded by Pioneer against the Property shall 
collectively be referred to as "Pioneer's Trust Deeds"). KDA finally transferred Parcel -025 
to Pine Pvidge on or about March 9, 2005. (See Quit Claim Deed, R. at 4174-4176, 
Appellant's Addendum at Tab 13.) Pioneer is now foreclosing on Pioneer's Trust Deeds and 
4 Although the date Pioneer encumbered Parcel -025 is disputed, at the earliest it was August 
14, 2001. (See Appellant's Addendum at Tab 8, f.n. 1 ("Pioneer's trust deed liens upon 
Parcel -025 were not recorded until [the Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds] were recorded on 
August 14, 2001")). Because the Andersen Defendants' interests in Parcel -025 were 
acquired prior to August 14, 2001, the Trial Court's determination Pioneer was on 
constructive notice prior to and through that date, the effective date of Pioneer's 
encumbrance of Parcel -025 is irrelevant to the Andersen Defendants except as explained in 
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seeking to eliminate the Andersen Defendants' leasehold, right of way, and other interests in 
the Property. 
In addition to indisputably acquiring their various interests in the Property prior to 
Pioneer, the Andersen Defendants established, and the Trial Court found, that when Pioneer 
made the loans, acquired Pioneer's Trust Deeds, and recorded Pioneer's Trust Deeds, it had 
actual notice, constructive record notice, and constructive inquiry notice of the Andersen 
Defendants' previously existing interests in the Property. 
B. Relevant Course of Proceedings 
Pioneer filed this action seeking to foreclose upon Pioneer's Trust Deeds. (See 
Complaints and Amended Complaints, R. at 3, 63, 582, and 2629.) Pioneer filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment to foreclose Pioneer's Trust Deeds as against the 
owner's/developer's interest in the Property and the interests of, among others, the Andersen 
Defendants. (See Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment of Foreclosure and 
Memorandum in Support, R. at 2962 and 2965.) In attempting to establish that Pioneer's 
Trust Deeds should have priority over the Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property, 
Pioneer asserted its interests were recorded prior to any of the Andersen Defendants' interests 
and relied solely on its contention that Utah's Recording Act establishes a "first in time, first 
in right" priority system, whereby priority is determined only "according to the order in 
which competing interests were recorded, with the first recorded interest having priority." 
(R. at 2980-2981.) Pioneer ignored, as it does in its Brief, whether Pioneer, as the 
Argument VI, below. 
5 
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subsequent purchaser, purchased the property in good faith, as is explicitly and clearly 
required in UTAH CODE ANN. §57-3-103 in order for a subsequent purchaser to prevail over 
a prior unrecorded interest. (R. at 2980 - 2981.) 
The Andersen Defendants opposed Pioneer's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
moved for summary judgment in their favor to establish their priority in the Property over 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds. (R. at 3639.) In the Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum, the Andersen Defendants established that an unrecorded interest in real 
property is valid and binding on a subsequent purchaser who has notice of the interest (even 
if the subsequent purchaser records first), and argued that Pioneer had actual and constructive 
notice of the Andersen Defendants' interests. (R. at 3649-3656.) Therefore, the Andersen 
Defendants argued their interests in the Property, whether recorded prior to Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds or not, had priority over Pioneer's interests in the Property (Pioneer's Trust Deeds) 
and a foreclosure by Pioneer on the Property would be subject to their interests. (Id.) 
C. Disposition by the Court Below 
On May 10, 2007, the Trial Court issued its Memorandum Decision ("Initial 
Decision"), based on the parties' summary judgment memoranda, applicable statutes and case 
law, and a March 28,2007 oral argument. (R. at 4366, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) In 
its Initial Decision, the Trial Court determined that the Andersen Defendants' interests in the 
Property were purchased, but not recorded, prior to the recording of the Amended Pioneer 
Trust Deeds, but that "[Pioneer] had constructive notice by way of record notice and inquiry 
notice as to [the Andersen Defendants'] interests in the property." (R. at 4381.) The Trial 
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Court concluded that Pioneer was not a bona fide, good faith purchaser as against the 
Andersen Defendants' interests and, as a result, Pioneer's recording failed to put them in a 
position of priority over the Andersen Defendants. (R. at 4383.) 
Ultimately, the Trial Court granted Pioneer's Motion for Summary Judgment to 
foreclose on the Property (R. at 4385) and granted the Andersen Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment establishing the Andersen Defendants' priority over Pioneer. (Id.) In 
short, the Trial Court authorized Pioneer's foreclosure of the Property subject to the 
Andersen Defendants'interests. (Id.) 
Various proposed judgments were circulated to embody the Trial Court's Initial 
Decision. Pioneer filed various objections to the proposed judgments, most of which were 
largely irrelevant to the Andersen Defendants. One Pioneer objection concerned the priority 
of lots nos. 49, 50, 51, and the Honeymoon Lot (collectively, the "Location Lots") based on 
their location (i.e., whether they were located on Parcel -025 or Parcel -036). After briefing 
on the objection by all affected parties ("Location Lot Defendants"), the Trial Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision in March 2008 establishing that until it was determined whether the 
Location Lots were on Parcel -025 or Parcel -036, it could not determine the priority of the 
Location Lots. (R. at 4778-4779, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 2.)5 
5 To understand the Trial Court's treatment of the Location Lots issue, it is essential to 
realize all Location Lots were acquired by the Location Lot Defendants after the First 
Pioneer Trust Deed was recorded. Pioneer's accusation that the Trial Court flip-flops 
between record and inquiry notice and its allegation that the Trial Court "retreated" from the 
inquiry notice theory (see Brief of Appellant at 9) is wholly without merit. Rather, because i 
the Location Lot Defendants acquired their interests in Parcel -036 after Pioneer, the 
Location Lot Defendants, (which included Brent Rhees) were subject to record notice of 
7 
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On January 6, 2009, the Trial Court entered the Second Corrected Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure and Order Pursuant to the Court's December 10,2008 Memorandum 
Decision ("January 2009 Judgment") (R. at 4906-4919, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 4). 
The January 2009 Judgment encapsulated the findings, conclusions, and orders the Trial 
Court previously made. At its core, it reiterated that Pioneer was not a good faith purchaser 
as against the Andersen Defendants because Pioneer had actual and constructive notice of the 
Andersen Defendants' interests and, as a result, Pioneer's Trust Deeds are inferior to and of 
lesser priority than the Andersen Defendants' property interests. (Id.) The 2009 Judgment 
further held that if the Location Lots were on Parcel -036, those interests would be 
subordinate to Pioneer's Trust Deeds (R. at 4916).6 Ultimately, the Trial Court determined 
that all Location Lots were located on Parcel -036 and subordinate to Pioneer's interests in 
the Location Lots. (See Updated Order and Judgment of Priority and Foreclosure of Location 
Lots, dated December 16, 2009, R. at 5432-5433, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 4.) 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to Andersen Defendants 
The Andersen Defendants incorporate by this reference, as if folly included herein, the 
statement of undisputed facts (numbered 1 through 43) contained in the Trial Court's Initial 
Decision, to the extent they are relevant to the Andersen Defendants' defense of this appeal. 
Pioneer's interests in Parcel -036 and subject to Pioneer's priority. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-
3-102 and -103 were applied by the Trial Court consistently throughout these proceedings. 
6 The January 2009 Judgment also dealt with the interest of certain defendants that Pioneer 
alleged had not paid their contracts and thus were not entitled to priority. This issue was not 
raised with respect to any of the Andersen Defendants and therefore is not an issue for the 
Andersen Defendants (see also Argument VII infra). The August 2010 Judgment on 
Payment Lots is likewise not an issue for the Andersen Defendants. 
£ 
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(Initial Decision, R. at 4367-4378, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) The Andersen 
Defendants identify the following facts for clarification and/or convenience of this Court: 
1. On February 19, 1988, KDA filed with the Rich County Recorder various 
documents for Sunrise Village, including bylaws and regulations, articles of incorporation, 
and maps of the property. (R. at 3606-3627.) KDA also recorded a declaration of 
membership plat giving a legal description of the property, and a hand-drawn plat detailing 
the different lots available for lease, including the phases of the planning development. (Id.) 
These recorded documents were all a matter of public record available at the Rich County 
Recorder's Office. (Initial Decision, R. at 4367, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
2. All Andersen Defendants acquired their interests [most from KDA Corporation 
("KDA")] in the Property prior to any of the Pioneer loans and prior to the recording of any 
of the Pioneer Trust Deeds. (Initial Decision, R. at 4367-4369, Appellant's Addendum at 
Tab 1.) A chart showing many of the Andersen Defendants' interests and date of purchase is 
attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 3 (see also Exhibits 2-11 to the Andersen Defendants' 
Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum, R. at 3259-3381), and a chart showing the 
remaining Andersen Defendants' undivided leasehold interests and date of purchase is 
attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 4 (see also Exhibits 12-17 to the Andersen Defendants' 
Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum, R. at 3383-3415, 3419-3443). 
3. Andersen Defendants Ronald Hunter, Kay Hunter, and/or the Estate of Randall 
Hunter recorded a Lease and Right of Way Grant Deed against the Property, Lot 18, on or 
about May 10,2001. As a result of this filing, Pioneer stated and confirmed that "it does not 
9 
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seek to foreclose upon or extinguish any interest of Site 18 ... in or to site 18 specifically, nor 
in or to Parcel -025 generally." (See Appellant's Addendum at Tab 8, f.n. 1, and Tab 9). 
4. Andersen Defendants John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt, as Trustees, recorded 
a Lease and Right of Way Grant Deed against the Property, Lot 16, in or about June 2001. 
As a result of these filings, Pioneer stated and confirmed that "it does not seek to foreclose 
upon or extinguish any interest of the Smidt Trust Lease Documents in or to Parcel -025." 
(See Appellant's Addendum at Tab 8, f.n. 2, and Tab 9.) 
5. Several leasehold interests (virtually identical interests to those of the other 
Andersen Defendants, except on different Lots) were recorded prior to the recording of any 
of the Pioneer Trust Deeds. (Initial Decision, R. at 4369, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
A chart of these interests is attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 5. (See also Exhibits 12-17 to 
the Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum, R. 3443-3489.) 
6. The recorded leases describe the leased property by lot number and, by use of 
words like "Members Association" and "recognize other Lessees rights", indicate that 
Sunrise Village is an integrated development with multiple lot owners. (See Addendum, Tab 
5; Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum at Exhibits 18-24, R. at 
3443-3489) (Initial Decision, R. at 4370, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
7. On October 12,1999, Dennis Yarrington began preparing data for an appraisal 
report on the four parcels -036, -037, -038, and -025. The appraisal was commissioned by 
Steve Baugh to induce Ralph Call, president of Pioneer ("Ralph Call"), and brother-in-law of 
Steve Baugh, to finance United West's purchase of the properties. The final appraisal report, 
m 
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dated November 14, 2000, was based on past and future sales of the different lots on the 
Property, and included descriptions of leaseholds that KDA had sold to members of Sunrise 
Village ("Yarrington Appraisal"). {See Yarrington Appraisal, Andersen Defendants' 
Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum at Exhibit 27, R. at 3499-3509; also see R. at 3822) 
(Initial Decision, R. at 4369, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
8. On or about November 13,2000, Pioneer loaned United West the principal sum 
of $900,000.00. As evidence of such loan, on or about November 13, 2000, United West 
executed and delivered to Pioneer a "Note Secured by Deed of Trust" in the principal amount 
of $900,000.00. As security for repayment of the loan evidenced by the November 13,2000 
Note, and concurrent with the execution and delivery of the Note, United West, as trustor, 
also executed in favor of Pioneer the First Pioneer Trust Deed, conveying parcels -036, -037, 
and -038, in trust. At some later date not earlier than August 14, 2001, Parcel -025 was 
added as security for the loans made by Pioneer. All of these events occurred after each and 
every Andersen Defendant had acquired his or her interest in the Property. (Initial Decision, 
R. at 4371, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
9. Prior to recording any of the Pioneer Trust Deeds, Pioneer, or its agents, had 
record notice that KDA had leased many of the Lots for two consecutive 50-year terms 
(totaling 100 years). (Initial Decision, R. at 4372, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) {See 
also Leases Recorded prior to Pioneer's Trust Deeds, Exhibits 18-24 to the Andersen 
Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum, R. at 3443-3489, Addendum, Tab 5). 
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10. Prior to the recording of any Pioneer Trust Deed pledging Parcel -025, the 
Andersen Defendants were in possession of and made improvements on their leased property, 
including concrete pads, fences, posts, parking, gravel driveways, power meters, planted 
trees, flowers and gardens, sprinkler systems, lawns, landscaping, patio furniture, a fire pit, 
family signs, etc. (most of which were done prior to the recording of the First Pioneer Trust 
Deed). (See Table Summarizing Andersen Defendant's Affidavits as to Improvements Made 
and Date of Improvements Made ("Table of Improvements"), attached hereto as Addendum, 
Tab 6.) There were individual Utah Power and Light meters to each Lot and recreational 
vehicles parked on various Lots. (Initial Decision, R. at 4372, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 
1) (see also Affidavits of Andersen Defendants, Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum at Exhibits 29-43, R. at 3517-3581, and Addendum, Tab 6.) 
11. The Andersen Defendants used their Lots prior to and since the time Pioneer 
recorded its deeds. (Id.) (Initial Decision, R. at 4373, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
12. Pioneer made no inquiry whatsoever as to the Andersen Defendants' possible 
interests in the Property. (Initial Decision, R. at 4372, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
13. In approximately April of 2001, R a^lph Call and Steve Baugh personally visited 
the Property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the Defendants' uses and improvements of 
the Property to the extent these were visible. (Initial Decision, R. at 4372, Appellant's 
Addendum at Tab 1.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pioneer's appeal is an attempt by a commercial lender with a bad loan to rewrite 
and/or circumvent Utah's Recording Act, thereby allowing the lender, Pioneer, to deflect the 
financial consequences of its bad loan onto the Andersen Defendants - innocent, 
unsophisticated, and good faith purchasers of real property interests in the Property. Utah's 
Recording Act is clear in language and application, as evidenced by Utah case law, that a 
subsequent purchaser of property is protected against a prior unrecorded interest in the same 
property only if the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and without 
notice, whether actual or constructive, of the prior unrecorded interest. 
The Trial Court was correct in determining Pioneer was not a good faith purchaser of 
its interests in the Property, as compared to the Andersen Defendants' prior interests therein. 
The Trial Court determined Pioneer had actual notice and constructive record notice of the 
Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property prior to acquiring and recording its own 
interest in the Property, sufficient grounds to prevent Pioneer from being protected under 
Utah's Recording Act. The Trial Court's determinations of Pioneer's actual and constructive 
record notice were not appealed by Pioneer and, therefore, this Court should defer to and 
uphold the Trial Court's conclusions. 
Further, the Trial Court was correct in its determination that Pioneer had constructive 
inquiry notice of the Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property. When a person has 
actual knowledge of certain facts and circumstances that are sufficient to give rise to a duty 
to inquire further, if such inquiry and investigation would have resulted in the discovery of 
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the prior interests, the subsequent purchaser is not entitled to priority over the prior, 
unrecorded interests and is not a good faith purchaser. 
Pioneer was aware of, or should have been aware of, sufficient facts and 
circumstances regarding the Andersen Defendants' interests to give rise to a duty on 
Pioneer's part to inquire further into the Andersen Defendants' interests, especially given the 
fact Pioneer is making a $1.5 million dollar loan. Ralph Call visited the Property and 
admittedly saw occupation of and improvements to various Lots on the Property, and Pioneer 
had, or had access to, recorded leases that clearly indicated that Sunrise Village is an 
integrated development with multiple lot owners or leaseholders. Various other documents, 
including regulations, bylaws, articles of incorporation, maps, a declaration of membership 
plat, and a plat detailing the different lots available for lease, were recorded, available to 
Pioneer, and indicated the presence of multiple lot owners. Also, Pioneer had access to the 
Yarrington Appraisal which expressly identified several of the Andersen Defendants' 
interests (R. at 3499-3509, 3796-3796, 3799-3801, 3822). 
Based upon the foregoing, Pioneer had a duty to inquire as to the Andersen 
Defendants' interests. This inquiry, which could have been a simple telephone call to the 
Sunrise Village Members' Association, would have led to the discovery of all Andersen 
Defendants' interests. Therefore, Pioneer had inquiry notice of the Andersen Defendants' 
interests and, as a result, is not protected by Utah's Recording Act. 
It is well established that summary judgment is only precluded on a factual dispute 
when a material fact is genuinely controverted. Pioneer contends three issues of material fact 
14 
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preclude summary judgment: the existence and extent of improvements on the Property, 
Pioneer's actual knowledge of the improvements, and Pioneer's receipt and review of the 
Yarrington Appraisal. However, these facts are either not material or not genuinely 
controverted. 
First, the extent of the improvements made to the Property was established by 
Affidavits taken from each Andersen Defendant. These Affidavits have never been disputed. 
Ralph Call stating that he did not see them, or that they were covered by snow, is insufficient 
to create a dispute of fact. Second, Ralph Call admitted in his 2006 Affidavit that he saw and 
had actual knowledge of improvements on the Property. The extent of the improvements 
Ralph Call had actual knowledge of is immaterial, as the Trial Court's inquiry notice ruling 
relies only on improvements Ralph Call admitted seeing. Third, it is undisputed Pioneer 
knew of and had access to the Yarrington Appraisal prior to making its loan that encumbered 
Parcel -025. Whether Pioneer had the appraisal prior to its First Trust Deed is immaterial. 
Finally, the omission in the 2009 Judgment of the phrase "of record" when the court 
was quoting only a portion of a warranty deed, the date Pioneer effectively encumbered 
Parcel -025, the Payment Lot issues, and the title insurance issues, are not an issue to the 
Andersen Defendants, except as otherwise provided herein. If it is determined Pioneer did 
not effectively encumber Parcel -025 until it recorded its Corrected Affidavit on September 
24, 2002, or until it recorded its Settlement Deed on March 14, 2005, Pioneer would have 
additional record notice of all Andersen Defendants' interests that were recorded, as shown 
in Addendum at Tab 7, prior to the date Pioneer is deemed to have encumbered Parcel -025. 
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should determine there are no genuine disputes of material fact and. as a 
matter ui* law, Pioneer was not a good faith purchaser entitled to protect!* . i;;; \\: s 
Recording Act. This Court s l i U U i l i , 1 ! ! ! . , . ; • '... . ' • i ' " 1 . 
AlUJUlVmiYi 
I. i HE 1M1AL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE ANDERSEN DEFENDWT ^ THERE ARE NO 
GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE ANDERSEN 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO J U D G M E ^ A S A M ATTFR OF LAW 
\\:. ^ ..... < ,ai,. .v... . - ; • •• *v •admLis...on 
. - u L. e11 . •'-•<"' 4iuw thai liierc ib no genuine issue as le an) material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I JTAHR. Civ. P. 
56(c). Only diNpulcd facts that are relevant, material, and genuine can bar summaiy 
ji ldgment. See generally H uitour v A'u1 IUJH hue I \>rp S^ll1 \\ *)| (\\ I "'lah I  1,< Ill Murthvk 
.- *>\\\t h . " : y id OJ. 
m ruling <»n a summ ,rx ridgineiii niuiion, a e^irt reviews the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, but "bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact. Rawson v. Conover. JtMl 111 y\ *\\>\. ]\iV \i\#7h. 'An iidu'rsc pam 
- ^ !."•». !VM ; •• ;iiL mere allcL>a^ :>t- i denials of the pleadings, but the response. ..must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I JTAHR. CIV. P We), 
"Once the moving part)' challenges an element oi the non-moving party's ca^e oi *., r.^ -
thatnogenuine i^ucoi m.nuiai lau exive-. • •*•' ^ : ( : «*?, * - * - -( 
prcse .!- u- ^ - v e ^ ^ - .*.>•:..;• - . :>,
 l i lc i^sue of material fact." Shaw Res. 
/ ttl v. Pri/i//,. Gushee & Bachtell, P.C, 2006 U ! App 313,f22, 142 P.3d 560. 
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On appeal, summary judgments are reviewed for correctness. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 
19, [^16, 250 P.3d 56. An appellate court in such an instance "make[s] its own decision on 
the correctness of summary judgment, reviewing the same paper record that was before the 
trial court to decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id at 117. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated "[w]e affirm a grant of summary judgment only if there are no disputed issues of 
i 
material fact and if, viewing the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, we determine that the moving party was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT 6,147, 247 P.3d 380. { 
As to the Andersen Defendants, the requisite material facts in this case are undisputed, 
support summary judgment, and are taken directly from the incontroverted evidence j 
presented to the Trial Court. Therefore, this Court should uphold the Trial Court's decision 
granting the Andersen Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
< 
II. PIONEER HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 
ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS5 CLAIMS IN AND TO THE PROPERTY AT 
ISSUE IN THIS DISPUTE AND THEREFORE DID NOT TAKE! IN GOOD 
FAITH 
I 
Pioneer had actual and constructive notice (including both constructive record notice 
and constructive inquiry notice) of the Andersen Defendants' interests and claims in and to 
4 
the Property. Therefore, any foreclosure by Pioneer on the Property, or any portion of the 
Property, should be subject to any and all interests claimed by the Andersen Defendants, as 
owners, leaseholders, and right of way holders. Pioneer's rights in the Property created by { 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds are inferior to the property interests of the Andersen Defendants. 
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Pioneer usserls thai "|f]or determining the priority of interests in real property, the 
Utah Legislature has enacted a recording statute whiel is a matter of law. cnuilics the rule 
of'first in time, first inn sht *" U M I ^ Xpr^aniau - , 
\ -ah s reeoi\ ...r .>uuuu j . •. • > • >: JOKIHU', |n \\\c order in which competing 
inleresls w^r nvonlnl with the first-recorded interest having priority." (M) However, 
contrary to Pioneer's assertions, Utah is a "race-notice" \u Udiction when it comes to its 
recording statute, not simply a "race" jurisdiction as Pioneer woulo 
imtk , v*<,u . . • • •*•*! i i l^Li l l l ime" 
*"
 s
 ••**• ci Utah's Recording Aa. U^aha Recording Act provides: 
bach document not iccorded as provided in *h'.\ tak K \oid as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or am portion of it. if - I )the 
subsequent purchaser purchased ihe property in good faith and tor a s auiahk: 
consideration; and *"* the subsequent purchaser1 'nnimr* ;^ r%r*' ih^ 
recurdr^ 
Hi UlConi ANM $ S7.VHK (Siipp }"\U)\ see also L.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 IJT 
App 303, 990 P.2d 945 (an unrecorded interest in iv.T property is valid and binding on a 
subsequent purchaser who has noti.ee of the interest even though the subsequent purchaser 
records first), ! u Jo as IMoneei icqucsls and (real 1 lfih\ Recording /V! its \ WLPKV" stntute, 
rut her than, a "nice-not ieeVI statute, would overlook the "good faith" component of the statute 
and alter the clear legislative intent and language of (lie Utah Recording Act itself 
Utah law provides that a "subsequent purchaser un > aiue prevails over a previous 
purchase! u i,.^  ^un^cquc;.. puivi.a^ "* r.J (2) records before the 
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previous purchaser." Haik, 2011 UT 26, ]f 13. To take title to property in "good faith," well-
defined Utah case law provides: 
To be in good faith, a subsequent purchaser must take title to the property 
without notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in the property. [The Supreme 
Court of Utah] recognizes two types of notice: (1) actual notice and (2) 
constructive notice. Actual notice arises from actual knowledge of an 
unrecorded interest or infirmity in the grantor's title. Constructive notice can 
be either inquiry or record notice. 
Id. at f 14 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Salt Lake County., v. Metro W. 
Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, Tfl3, 89 P.3d 155; First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 
966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998). 
The Trial Court summarized Utah's constructive notice law as it relates to priority of 
competing interests in real estate (by referring to this Court's First Am. Title Ins. Co., 966 
P.2d 834, 837-38 (Utah 1998) decision), as follows: 
There are two types of constructive notice that are generally recognized. One 
kind of constructive notice is notice which results from a record or which is 
imputed by the recording statutes; and the other is notice which is presumed 
because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should 
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact. Utah law 
recognizes both types of constructive notice. The first type is evidenced in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-2(1) [now UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102(1)], which 
provides that documents and instruments filed with the county recorder 
pursuant to § 57-3-2(1) [now UTAH CODE ANN, § 57-3-102(1)] impart notice 
to all persons of their contents. Utah case law has also recognized the second 
type of constructive notice, inquiry notice. 
... Inquiry notice occurs when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable 
person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part. Whatever is notice 
enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is 
notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has 
sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of 
it. 
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St u " c il so Initial Decision, R. at 4380 (quoting the above). 
Pioneer is not entitled to protection by I Jtah's Recording Act because Pioneer did not 
acquire its interest in the Property in good, faith, which n. a ncccssitv lorprota'1!"" IHKIC ^iid 
Act. Kathci", ii'iiiiiH'ti' ;u;t|iiin il nil interest in iln hroperh after having actual notice, 
\ utislniclkc record notice, and constructive inquiry notice of the Andersen Defendants' 
interests in the property. I herefore, the Andersen Defendants' unrecorded interests are 
superior to and take priority over Pioneer'^ record,; . -.i ci\ J • , • > j v 
A iioiicei uiu 'nut lake liic Piopcit - <\\\'\ vcaubc it nad actual notice of 
the Andersen Defendants' claims anu mulcts in and to the Property. The 
Trial Court's adjudication of actual notice was not appealed by Pioneer. 
I he Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property are superior to and have priority 
over Pioneer's interests in the Property because Pioneei U.J ;au;a ;, :>., . , . . - . 
Defendants' inkicsts in and In Iln I*i*,t|>i, il Ill n. \ Icai I Hah \ Ro.online Act h> .1 race-notice 
skttiit"" wliH'Ii inquires lark of actual notice or knowledge of an unrecorded interest or 
infirmity in the grantor's title for a subsequent purchaser to prevail in multiple conveyances 
of the same land JTaiL 201} T T ?A «M 1 (citing .S't/,7 1,,M- < aunty 
notice arises \x\n\\ a^.a.:; •*: ^ . U ^ L .riuw :.; -\\ - - <> - :ir .** H!tnr\, 
mill 11\ Id 
In its January 2009 Judgment, the Trial Court unequivocally holds that "[Pioneer] had 
actual notice of the Andersen Defendants' ... respecti\ c .n'.ere^u a; ; a:vc • = 
" The terms "Parcel Y* and "Parcel _ r^ci u> raitei -•.. .* aiiu I'ai^cl -io<), respective!). . 
real propert) interests in eontro\ers\ ol'an\ and all «^  ihfi Ap.lorsen I Vfend.mts, as defincu 
herein, arc !-»'->t.»j ^iiii^r or p m M l , ^ p >. ' " 
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Property." (R. at 4912.) This is a separate, distinct, and sufficient ground to uphold the Trial 
Court's decision regarding the priority of the parties' property interests. 
Because Pioneer did not appeal this issue, this issue is not before this Court, and must 
be upheld. See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2006 UT App 425, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 471 at *2 
("any portion of a judgment not appealed from continues in effect"); DeGrazio v. Legal Title 
Co.} 2006 UT App 183,2006 Utah App. LEXIS 193 at *7 ("when a party does not appeal an 
i 
issue, that issue is not before the appellate court"); Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 818 (Utah 1991) ("North Salt Lake does not appeal the Trial Court's ruling holding a 
portion of the ordinance unconstitutionally vague, and that issue is not, therefore, before this ' 
Court"); Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 418-19 (Utah 1981) (holding a 
judgment not appealed may not be attacked on appeal); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442,445 
(Utah 1978) (holding "[The Supreme Court of Utah] cannot rule on a matter not before [the 
Court]. In short, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to affirm a matter below when that 
i 
matter has not been appealed"). 
Pioneer did not appeal the Trial Court's conclusion that Pioneer had actual notice of 
the Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property. Therefore, Pioneer's actual notice is not 1 
an issue before this Court, and this Court should defer to the Trial Court's determination. 
Pioneer's actual notice and knowledge of the Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property, 
as was determined by the Trial Court, precludes Pioneer, as a subsequent purchaser, from 
obtaining priority of the Andersen Defendants' prior claims and interests in and to the 
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Proper! \ Based on this alone, the ' Trial Court's determinations regarding priority of the 
parties9 respective interests should be affirmed. 
B. Pioneer did not take the Property in good faith because it had constructive 
record notice of the Andersen Defendants' interests. The Trial Court's 
adjudication of constructive record notice was not appealed by Pioneer. 
1
 • • N cii i Jeicndanb*' interests in the Property are superior to and have priority 
over Pioneer's interests in the Property because Pioneer had constructive record ioii^ i : uie 
Andersen Defendants' interests in and to the rrope. * . • ..*.* ;.: •••- that 
the subsequent purchase! laL lilli IHIIM, ' • iitr alia, constructive record 
noli' he pnoi interest. Record notice results irom a record or is imputed b\ the 
recording statutes. Thus, purchasers of real property are charged with having record doiue 
of the contents of recorded documents. 
In its linuar) 1\*W Imk'iiicnl llie ln.il i'miil held "Plaintiff had ... constructive 
•' • • *
 !< ! • ? '• (endants' ... respective interests m Parcels 1 .tnd ? ^f (he 
Pi-^'T1)." l'he liuiul Decision, upon which the January 2009 Judgment is based in part, 
explains the Trial Court's finding of constructive record i.^u^c a.-. : 
[Pioneer] had constructive notice \-.: >\a\ e: reeoru nonce . . as ?•• M'w 
Andersen Defendants/j interests in the propert). Plaintiff had available to si 
the descriptions and plats recorded on behall of Sunrise Viliage RV Pa: k aiui 
the KDA-United West and K DA-Pine Ridge Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
which provided ihe hu\er with ihe rLihl u* lease the 24 remaining \ou on 
parcel 0~ "v J TaintiIT had record nonce of numerous existing leaseholders. 
Plainti!"! also had a\ailable ihe warranty deeds that limited the interest 
conveyed, and also provided record notice of existing *^H <""»v aszrccnenK 
memberships, and leases. 
I w •, :: \ppellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
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The Trial Court also made findings on record notice to support the aforementioned 
conclusions, including the following: 
1. On February 19, 1988, KDA filed with the Rich County Recorder various 
documents for its Sunrise Village RV Park, including regulations, by-laws 
of the members' association, articles of incorporation, and maps of the 
property. Also on this date, KDA recorded a declaration of membership 
plat giving a legal description of the property, and a hand-drawn plat 
detailing the different RV Lots available for lease, including the phases of 
the planned development. These recorded documents were all a matter of 
public record available at the Rich County Recorder's Office. < 
4. Several leasehold interests (virtually identical interests to those of the other 
KDA Defendants, except on different Lots) were recorded prior to the 
recording of the Pioneer trust deeds. The owners of those leases recorded 
prior to the Pioneer Trust Deed are not named as Defendants, including.... { 
5. The recorded leases describe the leased property by site number. By use of 
the words "Members Association" and "recognize other Lessees rights" in 
all of the leases, such leases indicate that Sunrise Village is an integrated 
development with multiple lot owners or leaseholders. 
8. On September 18, 2000, in anticipation of the transaction from KDA to 
United West conveying lots -036, -037, and -038 (RV Park Property), 
Harold Heninger (principal of KDA) and Joseph Hardy (principal of | 
United West, and later of Pine Ridge) reached a "letter of understanding," 
which acknowledges that Hardy would release the 5 acres of-025 to the 
homeowner's association when the 24 lot of the RV park initial phase was 
sold. 
i 
9. On October 17, 2000, KDA and United West executed a "purchase and 
sale agreement," which shows that parcels -036, -037, and -03 8 were to be 
conveyed to United West, but that parcel -025 was not intended to be 
conveyed, though the right to lease the remaining unsold lots in -025 was . 
given to United West. 
On November 13, 2000, KDA conveyed parcels -036, -037, and -038 to 
United West via warranty deed. 
I 
(Initial Decision, R. at 4367-4378, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) 
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I n nddition to Pioneer's failure to appeal the Trial Court's conclusion disci issed above 
regarding actual notice, Pioneer likewise foiled to appeal the Trial Court.'s conclusion that 
Pioneer had constructive record notice 01 u.^ .\i;,.c>. : - \ o^  \V\X\\\ in llie 
Property, rh1 . . , . * • * - ^ • K- !> Pendants' prior interests is 
ii< if an isMje WW nv this Court, and this Court should affirm the Trial Court's determination 
that Pioneer was on consiruciixc record notice of the Andersen Defendants' interests. 
C. Pioneer did not take the Property in gooq lain. ^ ii had constructive 
inquiry notice of the Andersen Defendants' clain^ a,.u interests in and to the 
Property. 
hoiRYi" h.til constructive inqi liry notice of the Andersen Defendants' interests in the 
Property and, as a result of such innuw\ notice. P i ^ e c ^ interests in the Property are 
subordinate t- the \ndersen Defendants' interests. Inquiry notice i:; piopi \\\ imposed 
against a"" subsequei it pi ircl laser \ ( - 1 iei i. tl: ic si ibseqi lent pi irchaser has acti lal 1 ;:i low ledge of 
. -?a!' "• J* - ' niN!:»i\..- *h:;t vi\e rise to a duty to inquire further. See Haik, 2011 UT 
at [^14. Further, "[wjhatever is notice enough to excite aucniion and put t]u partv on hi^ 
guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to w - -. n -.* • -r^u^y migni ;;a\ , 
such party should he deemed tonvusant *\\ • ' !')?'** !»< / ''c his r0 , QMI P ?t\ :i\ 838. 
I 'h iall> „ a si ibseqi lent pi irchaser has IIUIUMA notice ot any unrecorded interests of parties in 
open and notorious possession oTiIK properu S.tJiJ'.ikc H.&W.R.R v Allied MaterUHS 
Co , 291 P.2d 883 (I Jtah 10S^ : UP C i n- i « \, < ^ AMI ; : .. ^ . r 
^ . 44 r. d /M (citing A... .; .. • i. • 
04 
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This Court in its Haik v. Sandy City decision recently commented on inquiry notice.8 
The Haik decision emphasizes the low level of actual information needed by a subsequent 
purchaser to trigger application of inquiry notice. In Haik, opposing parties' priority to a 
certain water right was at issue. 2011 UT at fflf 3-9. Sandy City purchased the water right 
first, and recorded an Agreement of Sale with the county recorder in 1977, but the deed 
evidencing such conveyance was not recorded by Sandy City until 2004. Id. In 2003, the 
Haik parties purchased the same water right and promptly recorded the deed. Id. The issue 
in Haik was whether the Agreement of Sale (which this Court treated as an executory 
contract) put the Haik parties on record notice of Sandy City's unrecorded interest in the 
disputed water right. Id. at ^ 11. It was determined the Agreement of Sale put the Haik 
parties on record notice that Sandy City had an equitable interest in the water right. Id. at f 
12. While record notice of an equitable interest in property can subvert a subsequent 
purchaser's claim of having purchased in good faith, this Court held it did not in this case 
because the Haik parties reasonably believed they had clear and inviolate title, 27 years had 
passed since the Agreement of Sale was recorded with no deed being recorded, and the Haik 
parties' predecessors in interest had maintained and possessed the water right and filed a 
8 Pioneer classifies inquiry notice as a "rare exception to the general rule of record notice 
under Utah's recording statute." (Brief of Appellant at 29.) First, Utah's Recording Act 
protects subsequent purchasers only if the subsequent purchaser takes in good faith without 
notice of the prior interest. Second, inquiry notice is not an exception to a general rule, but 
rather is the general rule, in that consideration of inquiry notice is necessary to determine I 
whether the subsequent purchaser acquired the interest in good faith. See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§57-3-103. 
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change application in i9yl>, ail without Sandy C]\\ contesting ownership to the water right. 
Oils Court found for Hie Hails parties on these grounds. 
Despite me iaci tr.ev » -;l did nut apph mqihn i. In .1 ommcnlcd on • 11«111 ir> notice 
-is follows; 
Inquiry notice is not ai issue in thi^ ease because IheTTaik Parties did not have 
actual knowledge e(i\\\\ facw. such as the existence of the Agreement ol Sale, 
giving rise to a dul\ to inquiie further. Sec 7 H Ranch. %6 l\2d ai 838 
("IHnquin notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and circumstances, 
r:;4 from records/*). I lad the llaik Parties known ol the Agreement ot Sale, 
they would have had actual knowledge about the posMhie defect in title and 
would have been on inquiry notice to inquire further. And upon further inquiry, 
it is likely that the Haik Parties would have discovered Sand) Cityfs deed > the 
water right. 
Id. at f.n. 1.4. (emphasis added) Thus, if the Haik parties had simply known of,;.. Agreement 
of Sale's existence, this Courl, in determining pi .-H il\ nl i,oinpcling inleresh \\<\\ Id llliaie 
applies .,*. . "^amlv < id. 
in u.i .^., a ujin:*-"^ leased a small part of a parcel of property to post a large sign. 
990 l\2d at 9-J(| The lease u as not recorded until two years after the property was sold and 
the new deed recorded i IK I ourl determined thai the lease was \ ahd and buidini', on llio 
-.
 (iv. i.IN h;K ,,.M- i* — - ,'-v • ' \ • -. - UNIIS nf he existence of the sign w hich created 
a duty to inquire. Id. at 954. 1 he Court concluded thai "a simple telephone call .couldhave 
confirmed or dispelled an\ question" regarding the lea^c interest. LL \> m c * i ^mple 
telephone caii IA Pioneer to U!L -Wtl. . . „1L * 
I : i< )i leer ki ic . v*.-,>.- .. ; . •if(-.1-.a -, - . <-. ^ t t Ailiuavii oi k u i 
Depew in Siipport of Motion for Summary Judgment, Andersen Defendants' Summary 
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Judgment Reply Memorandum at Exhibit 44, R. at 3588 (Ken Depew, President of the 
Sunrise Village Homeowners' Association, stating Pioneer did not contact him regarding 
potential interests in the Property, and affirming that if Pioneer had done so, he would have 
disclosed all leasehold interests, recorded and unrecorded).) 
In another Utah Supreme Court case, this Court adopted the statement that 
"[possession of land is notice to the world of every right that the possessor has therein." 
Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d at 886 (quoting 39 Am. Jur. Section: 18, p. 242). In Allied, 
this Court ruled that a purchaser was on inquiry notice when an interested party had personal 
property on the premises. Id. The mere presence of poles and wires on a part of the property 
amounted to possession of the land which put the subsequent purchaser on notice of the 
interest. Id. 
In Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that when a purchaser observed use of the land, he had inquiry notice of a right of way 
across the property. In Arnold, inquiry notice was applied, and the subsequent purchaser was 
required to search within the public record, but the duty to inquire was not limited to inquiry 
into the public record. Id. It requires steps be taken in addition to search of the public 
record, such as inquiry by telephone call to a party with a potential interest. Id. 
Pioneer was aware of circumstances that did, or should have, put Pioneer on guard as 
to the possible existence of the Andersen Defendants' claims to the Property. The Trial 
Court was correct in it its lawful application of inquiry notice to the case at hand based, in 
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part, on Ralph Call's .April 2001 visit to the Property In his October 2006 Affidav it, R alph 
Call, admits he sailed Ihe rmpeiU \\\ \ r i h .:;; i ; and .Mil;. v a ^ u mipj> ^ ^ 
i he in si nine J w*. n. n» the pioperiv ifuu is nic .salJJeel ol Urn case was u: Apih 
of 2001 and I aid not re-visit the site until after August 2001. Ihe purpose of 
that visit was to pick out a portion of the property that was io he come; ed i-
nie. There was snow .m the ground w hen l was there. At most there were four 
or five recreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots on the 
property. I saw a few concrete slabs in scattered places where the snow had 
melted. There was a lodge on the property, and some small narrow roads. I 
did not see or notice any improvements of any type or nature to any part or 
portion of the property that is the subject of this ease " h<^ ] " -^ ihen* ;* ' 
• >f ?0ni Mth.M* fh:m ,is MIM forth in this nnrapnmh. . 
(See October 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call, R. at 4250, Appellant" > Addendu'M :.n Tab 1.5), 
(emphasis added"* Rased *>i* lhis affidavit admission. fhc THi1 rnnrt dctcnn11 JL . Ka:t »• • .: . 





 - * * .»• - i aiucd, "Lven 
with
 t | i e improvements indicated in ML. Call's allidas it, [and snow eo\ ering the ground,] a 
reasonable person would have been _ • * 1 • 1 i qui red further into the 
improvement - •./<,. i 
1
 • ' * . - ' -
;
 le ' i .e - ;uid Various 
Sunrise Village documents, including regulations and bylaws of the Sunrise Village Members 
Association, articles of incorporation, maps of the Property a declaration of membership p ht 
giving a legal uescrij-.i^., ei ihe property, aphk. WV.JH.... UI. ,: -,i,:i: • *;•*.; v . .. 
(, see, e.g. Ano r ' : - ':••>• \ \ \* ' i 
2, , 47-48 <<• a, 3643-3648, 3442-3489, 3498^3509, 3606-3627), and the Yarrington 
Appraisal (Pioneer undispiitedly had access to at least ihe fir-i few pages of the Yarrington 
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Appraisal prior to recording the Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds on August 14, 2001) (see 
Argument III.c. below for more detailed discussion of the Yarrington Appraisal), all of which 
reflected the fact that the Property had been divided into many different Lots and that at least 
some of those Lots had been leased. All of this information was at Pioneer's fingertips (to 
compare, in Haik, actual knowledge of a 30 year old Agreement of Sale alone, would have 
put the subsequent purchaser on inquiry notice). The Trial Court was correct in putting 
Pioneer on inquiry notice and determining Pioneer "knew lots existed" on the Property and 
Pioneer "could simply check membership records or even count the 'unsold lots' from the 
total platted to determine if the improvements were on lots that had been recorded or not." 
(Mat 4381.) 
Pioneer, like the purchasers in U.P.C, Allied Materials Co., and Arnold, possessed 
knowledge of the lessees' use of the land which was evident from the admitted improvements 
seen by Ralph Call on his visit. In the present case, the possession is much more obvious, 
extensive, and evident than the mere sign posted in U.P.C, and the presence of poles and 
wires in Allied Materials Co. The Andersen Defendants were in possession of the land and 
their undisputed substantial improvements. (See Table of Improvements, attached hereto as 
Addendum, Tab 6.; see also Affidavits, Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply 
Memorandum at Exhibits 29-43, R. at 3517-3581.) The Affidavits of improvements made by 
the Andersen Defendants to the Property are unrebutted, regardless of whether Mr. Call 
acknowledges seeing them while there was "snow on the ground". 
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Further, Pioneer's duty of inquiry shoi lid be enhanced due to the fact that when 
Pioneer loaned additional funds, and took the A meiuuit ru- >cc\ I \u>\ !X\d, as security 
(which attempied lo include Parcel 0J">|, (lie granlor n! the liiisl deed, Pine Ridge. did not 
ha < e record title of Parcel -025 (S u } Warranty Deed from K D A to Pine likhie transferring 
title of Parcel -036 and others, but not transferring title of h n e e l -025 in Pme Riduc. R. at 
4 1 7 8 - 4 * " ^ A p p e l l a n t \ Addendum at ^ i b 11 > n i n c Ridge did not ;.r.wni. ^,o\w -MC to 
- . -s- ' i^Noi • • . \ . - J L k i i n Deed, R. di 4174-4176, 
N
 • vjdanf s A d d e n d u m at Tab 13 . ; 
In Salt Lake County, 2 0 0 4 1 IT atfflf 15-19, 8 9 P ^d 1^ c this Court he id a p.uehaser 
w h o acquires property through ., . , -. , ^ *d 
0"\ < nership o! '- ' • . . • .-n\. ! •, defect in his erantor^ title 
and will not q !• 1 \ as a subsequent purchaser in good iaith loi purposes of Utah's Recording 
Statute." Because P ioneer ' s grantor did not have record title of Parcel -025 (see Warranty 
Deed, W'Uua* .- < oncerning Kccordc-vi instruments, and Qi lit Claii n Deed, Appellai it 's 
Addemiiiiii.il I'lihs III II1" and II iespei ' l i \e1\ ) and was thus founded on a wild deed, it is 
clear Pioneer was not a good iaith purchaser entitled to protect ion under U tah ' s Reec>rding 
Statute. The Andersen Defendants should not be punished for P ioneer ' s failure to inquire 
further into tl le status of the I Property before mak ing additional loans. 
Despi te P ioneer ' s admit ted know ledge of the ii i lpi en ements \ isible at the tin le of 
Ralph Ca l l ' s visit "to the Proper? \ , and other unique circumstances evidencing competing 
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interests in the Property, Pioneer failed to make any calls or otherwise communicate or 
inquire regarding the Andersen Defendants' interests. (See Initial Decision, R. at 4381 
("[Pioneer] either failed or refused to make any inquiry").) Such calls, communications, 
and/or inquiries would easily and certainly have led to the discovery of the Andersen 
Defendants' interests, evidenced by the fact that the Yarrington Appraisal disclosed the 
Andersen Defendants' interests. (See Yarrington Appraisal, R. at 3822 (Map included in 
Yarrington Appraisal identified each Andersen Defendant Lot as "sold") and 3796-3797, 
3799-3801 (used five Andersen Defendants' Lots as comparables.) Pioneer could have, and 
should have, done the same. 
Pioneer would have this Court believe that secured lending would be turned on its 
head if inquiry notice is applied in this case. (See Brief of Appellant at 31.) Pioneer further 
states that a "lender could never be certain of all interests". (Id. at 30-34) Constructive 
inquiry notice does not require a lender to be certain of every interest, but rather requires a 
lender (or subsequent purchaser) to take steps a reasonable person would take to determine 
claimants of property interests in the subject parcel. Such does not, and has not, turned the 
secured lending industry "on its head" and is not contrary to public policy. In fact, the case 
for application of inquiry notice is strengthened in this case because Pioneer, as a lender 
loaning $1.5 million dollars, should, as a matter of public policy and industry norms, be even 
more diligent in verifying the status of the property used as security. Public policy would be 
harmed by protecting a lender who turns a blind eye to substantial evidence of contrary 
interests in the Property it takes as security, and then claims priority because it won the race 
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to the county recorder's office. The Trial Court, in accordance with established Utah law, 
properly applied inquiry notice against Pioneer. 
C DI ii t, P ionee r relies al i i: lostexcli ish ely on Utah bankruptcy court cases, placing most of its 
reliance on the case of In re Granada, Inc., 92B.R Mil H^tnki D V\:\h 1988) .S^ c Brief of 
Appellant at 32.) While concededly the inquiry notice standard is appi.-eu in « -ranuiki. the 
facts are not compai .. .:.*..;. * • . 
«i" lran<i\ /<."" iii\ otvnl a himkniptcv debtor w ho purchased an entire mobile home park, 
comprised of individual mobile home park units that were rented, to tenants The entire 
)• -^ "1c home pari was later conveyed, to or acquired, by a subsequent party, who did not 
record its ii iterest. ' 1 1 i.e bank ruptcy ti ustee is atten lptii i,g to a v oid the sul^rqueui purl) s 
bona fide purchaser would not have been on notice of the subsequent purchaser's interest in 
the mobile home park as of the petition filing date. The issue in Granada regards ownership 
of and prion i> u. tiie mobile home park development as aw hole, not to indi\ idi lal clain lants 
of parts ai id parcels of tf le t t lot )ik 1 io:t i le pai k c >i t:c > claims ft oi I i those tenants renting the 
mobile homes located within the mobile home park. 
The discussion of inquiry notice in Granada concerned, whether the inspection of the 
property on the petition filing date would ha vc revealed tl: le ownership interests of the 
Therefore, contrary to Pioneer's arguments, this case is factually unique and inapplicable to 
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the case at hand. The case at hand does not involve priority of the developer's interest, but 
rather of the Andersen Defendants' 100-year entitlement to and rights in the Property, 
evidenced by two consecutively running 50-year leases and grants of right of way. Granada 
is akin to determining the priority of the owners of an apartment complex, rather than 
leaseholders. A purchaser of an apartment complex typically takes subject to the rights of 
existing leaseholder, in possession, most with unrecorded leases. 
Granada held that there was nothing an inspection would have produced which was 
inconsistent with record title. In the case at issue, through the facts admitted by Pioneer and 
the unrebutted facts of the Andersen Defendants, and as determined by the Trial Court, a 
reasonable inspection of the Property would have (and admittedly did (see October 2006 
Affidavit of Ralph Call, R. at 4250, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 15)) produced knowledge 
that was inconsistent with record title. Pioneer admitted to seeing improvements to various 
Lots that were of a permanent nature, such as cement slabs. (Id.) These are not simply 
seasonal improvements, and the Andersen Defendants' interests were not limited to seasonal 
use, as alleged by Pioneer. Such improvements and conditions are not of the nature of what 
you would expect to see in an RV Park. (Id.) As the Trial Court stated, 
Even with the improvements indicated in [Ralph] Call's affidavit, a reasonable 
person would have been put on guard and inquired further into the 
improvements, especially if one had a trust deed for over 1.5 million dollars 
that would be jeopardized if it was junior to any other interest. [Pioneer] either 
failed or refused to make any inquiry. [Pioneer] knew lots existed and could 
simply check membership records or even count the "unsold lots" from the 
total platted to determine if the improvements were on lots that had been 
recorded or not. If it was determined that some of the lots had not been 
recorded then it would seem that a reasonable person would inquire to see if 
the lots had been sold/leased. 
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(Initial Decision, R. at 4381-4382.) This Court's Mathis decision holds "[a]ctual possession. 
. . when open, visible, and exclusive, will put upon inquiry those acquiring any title to or a 
lien upon the land so occupied to ascertain the nature of the rights the occupants really have 
in the premises.") 261 P.2d at 959. Admittedly, Ralph Call knew various lots existed on the 
Property and saw open, visible, and exclusive actual possession of said various Lots within 
the Property, but Pioneer failed in its duty to inquire with those in possession as to the nature 
of the rights of the occupants in the premises. Pioneer failed in its duty to determine the 
nature of the possessors' interests. See Patel v. Rupp, 195 B.R. 779, 784 (D. Utah 1996) (a 
purchaser as part of its duty of inquiry "has to inquire of any persons in actual physical 
possession of the property of the extent of their interests" and must "learn of that potentially 
adverse claim upon inquiring of that person of their interest"). Such an inquiry would have 
led to the discovery of the Andersen Defendants' interests. 
This Court held in Ault, that: 
In race-notice states like Utah, a purchaser takes subject to rights of parties in 
possession that are open and visible. In other words, possession by someone 
other than the seller engenders a duty to inquire on the part of the purchaser 
into the rights of the party in possession. 
2002 UT 33 at f 42. According to the record, Pioneer made no inspection of the Property 
prior to taking an interest in it upon making its first loan in November 2000. All Andersen 
Defendants acquired their interests prior to that date, had made improvements to their 
respective Lots prior to November 2000 {See Table of Improvements, Addendum at Tab 6), 
and were in "open and visible" possession of their respective Lot interests in the Property. 
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Thus, pursuant to Ault, Pioneer takes subject to the Andersen Defendants' interests. Had 
Pioneer made an inspection of the Property prior to making the first loan and taking the First 
Trust Deed or prior to taking the Modified Trust Deed without "snow cover," as any prudent 
lender should do, it would have discovered the Andersen Defendants' substantial 
improvements to and possession of the Property. 
Pioneer had notice enough to "excite its attention," put it on guard, and require further 
inquiry on its part. A simple telephone call by Pioneer to the Sunrise Village Members' 
Association would have confirmed or dispelled any question regarding the leases. (See 
Affidavit of Ken Depew in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Andersen 
Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum at Exhibit 44, R. at 3588.) With one 
telephone call, Pioneer could have requested and received a list of all the leased Lots, 
including the names and addresses of the lessees. (Id.) Therefore, the Trial Court correctly 
put Pioneer on inquiry notice of everything to which a reasonable inquiry given the 
circumstances might have led, and was correct in its determination that such inquiry would 
have led to the discovery of the Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property. 
Further, even assuming arguendo that the Trial Court's application of inquiry notice is 
inappropriate as is argued by Pioneer, such application is not reversible error, because the 
Trial Court also held that Pioneer had actual notice and constructive record notice of all the 
Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property. Either of these notices alone is sufficient to 
affirm the Trial Court's decision. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT 
BASED ON ANY DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
At the Trial Court level, Pioneer did not raise any genuine issues of material fact that 
would preclude the Trial Court's summary disposition of this matter, and the Trial Court 
properly determined that the Andersen Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Summary judgment is not precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, 
but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 
P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980). Further, "bare contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts 
in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude the entry of summary 
judgment." Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, f 26,206 P.3d 302 (quotingMassey v. 
Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980); see also Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of 
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, \ 54,13 P.3d 581 (determining that reliance upon "unsubstantiated 
opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of fact"). 
In Pioneer's Brief, it asserts there are three genuine issues of material fact that 
"precluded summary judgment" or made the grant of summary judgment by the Trial Court 
in favor of the Andersen Defendants "inappropriate": first, the "existence of the purported 
improvements" on the Property; second, Ralph Call's actual knowledge of the improvements; 
and, third, Pioneer's access to and review of the appraisal report. 
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A. It is an undisputed fact that substantial and material improvements were made 
to the Property by the Andersen Defendants and the extent of such 
improvements are not material to the Trial Court's decision. 
It is undisputed that the Andersen Defendants made improvements to the Property. 
The following are some of the fmdings/"undisputed facts" made by the Trial Court as related 
to improvements made by the Andersen Defendants (and other defendants): 
18. Prior to the recording of the Pioneer Trust Deed which pledges the 
property in which most of these Defendants claim an interest [Parcel -025], 
Defendants were in possession of and made improvements on their leased 
property, including concrete pads, fences, posts, parking, gravel driveways, 
power meters, planted trees, flowers and gardens, sprinkler systems, lawns, 
landscaping, patio furniture, a fire pit, family signs, among others. There were 
individual Utah Power and Light meters to each lot and recreational vehicles 
parked on the leased properties. 
See Initial Decision at R. 4373, attached as Addendum 1 to Appellant's Addendum. This 
finding/undisputed fact was based on sworn affidavits from each of the Andersen Defendants 
as to the nature and extent of the improvements that were placed on the Property by the 
Andersen Defendants and the use of the Property by the Andersen Defendants. See Andersen 
Defendant Affidavits at R. 3517-3589 (the "Andersen Defendants' Affidavits). 
Pioneer would have this Court rely on the October 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call {see 
R, at 4248-4251, attached as Addendum 15 to Appellant's Addendum) to reverse the Trial 
Court's decision because Pioneer contends the above-cited finding/undisputed fact is material 
and is disputed. However, in his October 2006 Affidavit, Ralph Call does not dispute any of 
the contents of the Andersen Defendants' Affidavits, but rather simply states that there was 
"snow on the ground" when he visited the Property and that he "did not see or notice" any 
improvements besides parked camper trailers, concrete slabs, a lodge, and some roads. See 
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October 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call at R. 4250, Appellant's Addendum, Tab 15. Other 
than the "bare contention" that he "did not see or notice" the improvements made by the 
Andersen Defendants, as sworn to in Affidavits by the Andersen Defendants, neither Ralph 
Call nor Pioneer further address the contents of the Andersen Defendants' Affidavits or 
dispute that the improvements were made and readily visible. Ralph Call not seeing or 
noticing the improvements is not sufficient to raise a question of fact that would preclude 
summary judgment. Even if construed to be a disputed fact, the extent of the improvements, 
in addition to those "noticed" by Ralph Call, is not material, as the Trial Court did not rely on 
it nor did it affect the Trial Court's ultimate decision. 
B. The Trial Court's decision to grant the Andersen Defendants summary 
judgment was based, in part, on the undisputed fact that Pioneer visited the 
Property and had actual knowledge of improvements made to the Property by 
the Andersen Defendants. 
Despite Pioneer's attempt to make this Court believe otherwise, it is acknowledged by 
Pioneer that it had actual knowledge of at least some of the Andersen Defendants' 
improvements made to the Property. Among other things, actual notice of the improvements 
made to the Property and possession of the Property by the Andersen Defendants prevent 
Pioneer from being a good faith purchaser of the Property under the recording statute. 
The Trial Court, in reliance on the Andersen Defendants' affidavits, found that 
various and certain improvements had been made to the Property. (See Initial Decision at R. 
4368-4381, Appellant's Addendum at Tab 1.) Specifically, the court found that it was 
undisputed that the Andersen Defendants made improvements "including concrete pads, 
fences, posts, parking, gravel driveways, power meters, planted trees, flowers and gardens, 
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sprinkler systems, lawns, landscaping, patio furniture, a fire pit, family signs, among others." 
R. at 4373. Further, the court found that even though Pioneer disputed any actual notice of 
the claimed improvements. Pioneer had sufficient admitted actual knowledge of the 
improvements to put it on actual and constructive notice of the Andersen Defendants' claims 
in and to the Property. The Trial Court staited as follows: 
Plaintiff disputes that it had inquiry notice of the existence of the purported 
improvements and disputes any actual knowledge of these claimed 
improvements. Ralph Call (President of Pioneer) visited the site in April of 
2001 (a time when Bear Lake is typically still cold and few, if any, recreational 
activities are occurring) and saw improvements. (Finding #21.9) Even with 
the improvements indicated in Mr. Call's affidavit, a reasonable person would 
have been put on guard and inquired further into the improvements, especially 
if one had a trust deed for over 1.5 million dollars that would be jeopardized if 
it was junior to any other interest. Plaintiff either failed or refused to make any 
inquiry. (Finding #2010.) Plaintiff knew lots existed and could simply check 
membership records or even count the "unsold lots" from the total plaited to 
determine if the improvements were on lots that had been recorded or not. If it 
was determined that some of the lots had not been recorded then it would seem 
that a reasonable person would inquire to see if the lots had been sold/leased. 
Initial Decision, R. at 4381-4382 (emphasis added). I 
Therefore, even if Pioneer' s actual knowledge of the extent of the improvements made 
to the Property by the Andersen Defendants was disputed, as argued by Pioneer, it is 
< 
undisputed that Pioneer had actual knowledge of at least a portion of the improvements 
made. Ralph Call's October 2006 Affidavit, as quoted above, establishes as an undisputed 
9 Finding #21 states "In approximately April of 2001, Ralph Call and Steve Baugh 
personally visited the property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the Defendants' uses and 
improvements of the property to the extent these were visible." Initial Decision, R. at 4373. 
{ 
10 Finding #20 states "Pioneer did not inquire as to the Defendants' possible interests in the 
property." Initial Decision, R. at 4373. 
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fact that he had actual knowledge of some of the improvements made to the Property by the 
Andersen Defendants. This admitted actual knowledge shows Pioneer had actual knowledge 
of at least some of the improvements. (R. at 4250.) This admission by Ralph Call is, in part, 
what the Trial Court relied on in determining Pioneer had actual knowledge of the interests 
and putting Pioneer on inquiry notice. 
Whether or not there were other improvements on the Property made by the Andersen 
Defendants that Ralph Call did not see on his visit was immaterial to the Trial Court's 
ultimate decision to grant the Andersen Defendants summary judgment.11 Therefore, because 
Pioneer does not dispute that it had actual knowledge of improvements made to the Property 
by the Andersen Defendants (See 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call, R. at 4250), and because the 
Trial Court only relied on "Defendants' uses and improvements of the property to the extent 
they were visible" during Ralph Call's 2001 visit to the Property (See R. at 4373,4381-4382) 
to determine Pioneer had actual knowledge of the improvements, there remains no dispute as 
to a material fact creating a factual issue that would preclude summary judgment in favor of 
the Andersen Defendants by the Trial Court. 
11 In Pioneer's Brief at 36, it misstates, understandably without citation to the record, "the 
District Court ruled that Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, had actual knowledge of those 
claimed improvements [storage sheds, fire pits, rock walls, stairs, fences, landscaping, lawns, 
flowers, trees, gardens, family signs, patio furniture, sprinklers, water hookups, utility meters, 
cement pads, gravel driveways, parked RVs, etc.]". However, the court made no such ruling 
and did not find it material as to whether Ralph Call had actual knowledge of all of these 
improvements. The court simply held Pioneer had actual knowledge of the improvements to 
the extent they were visible when [Ralph] Call visited the property, and stated "with the 
improvements indicated in Ralph Call's affidavit, a reasonable person would have been put 
on guard and inquired further into the improvements...." (R. at 4381). 
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In short, even if it is a dispute of fact whether Pioneer had actual knowledge of the 
extent of the improvements made to the Property by the Andersen Defendants, such is not 
material to the Trial Court's decision; the Trial Court's inclusion of such in its discussion is 
not reversible error. The Trial Court makes this point as follows: "Though the extent of the 
improvements are disputed between the peirties, all parties involved agree that there were 
improvements made. Even the minimal improvements Mr. Call states he observed would put 
a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part." Initial Decision, R. 
at 4383. 
C. It is undisputed that Pioneer's principal Ralph Call received the Yarrington 
Appraisal before Pioneer's loan was made that encumbered Parcel -025. 
Pioneer, in its Brief of Appellant at 37, without basis, explanation, or citation to the 
record avers that the "District Court also relied heavily for its inquiry notice ruling on the 
claim that Pioneer's principal, Ralph Call, had received and read a certain appraisal report 
pertaining to the Property before Pioneer made any of its loans that are the subject of this 
case." While the Trial Court likely did consider the appraisal report as one of a myriad of 
factors in concluding that Pioneer had actual and constructive notice of the Andersen 
Defendants' property interests in the Property, it clearly was not the critical, sole, or 
determinative factor for any of the Trial Court's conclusions. Thus, any dispute regarding the 
appraisal report, especially as to whether Ralph Call actually read the report, is not material 
12 Contrary to Pioneer's position, the Trial Court did not rely at all in making its decision on 
Ralph Call reading the appraisal. In fact, the decision does not even contemplate Ralph Call 
reading the appraisal. Rather, the Trial Court stated Call (and Pioneer) had "access to an 
appraisal" and that having access to such appraisal and not reading it would be "akin to 
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and not reversible error. See Heglar Ranch, Inc., 619 P.2d at 1391 (summary judgment is not 
precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted"). 
Regarding the Appraisal, the Trial Court held, in its entirety, "Plaintiff had access to 
an appraisal on the property which identified many of the leased lots." Initial Decision, R. at 
4382. It continued, "[Pioneer]'s failure to review the property appraisal on land securing a 
one and a half million dollar loan seems akin to intentionally donning blinders." Id. at 4383. 
The Trial Court also found that "Prior to Pioneer's recording of its trust deed, Pioneer had 
access to an appraisal prepared by Dennis Yarrington that identified many of the leased 
properties (lots) ranging from Lot #3 to Lot #52, including information that leases were sold 
as late as October of 2000." R. at 4372. 
While Pioneer would have this Court believe that the Trial Court placed great 
emphasis on Pioneer's "receipt and review of the referenced appraisal report and related 
information" {see Brief of Appellant at 37), the fact of the matter is that the Trial Court only 
placed emphasis on the fact that the appraisal report was available to Pioneer for receipt and 
review. Never did the Trial Court intimate that Pioneer actually received or reviewed the 
appraisal report. It was Pioneer's own claims and affidavits that established Ralph Call had 
in fact received the appraisal report and information contained therein. (Id.) 
intentionally donning blinders." R. at 4372, 4383. 
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Given the foregoing and the admissions and testimony of Pioneer, it is undisputed that 
Pioneer had access to the appraisal before making any loans that encumbered lot -025. In the 
October 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call, he states as follows: 
With regard to the appraisal report that is Exhibit 27 to the Andersen Parties' 
Memorandum ..., I did not, in my individual capacity nor in my capacity for or 
on behalf of Pioneer, commission, request, authorize, Baugh to order or 
commission, nor did I know that Baugh had ordered or commissioned, that 
appraisal report. While I may have seen a paper showing an appraised value, I 
did not receive or see any other portion of that appraisal report until sometime 
after December 29, 2000. 
R. at 4250 (emphasis added); (see also Excerpts of the Yarrington Appraisal, including the 
two-page summary referred to by Ralph Call, Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum at Exhibit 27, R. at 3498-3509; Complete Yarrington Appraisal, R. at 
3757-3826.) 
A lender must be deemed to know that a two-page summary of an appraisal is just 
that, a summary, and a prudent lender would request the full appraisal report before 
proceeding. Thus, even if this is a material fact, it is undisputed that Pioneer had knowledge 
of and access to the Yarrington Appraisal before lending additional money to Pine Ridge on 
or about August 14,2001 (Pioneer loaned an additional amount of approximately $710,000, 
thereby increasing the amount due under Pioneer's notes in excess of $1.5 million), the loan 
that encumbered Parcel -025. The Yarrington Appraisal clearly identified all Andersen 
Defendants' leasehold and undivided interests in the Property (R. at 3822 (Map included in 
Yarrington Appraisal identifying each Andersen Defendant Lot as "sold")), and expressly 
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identified and used five of the Andersen Defendants' Lots as comparables (R. at 3796-3797, 
3799-3801.) 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT LEAVING OUT THE PHRASE "OF RECORD" WHEN 
QUOTING THE PIONEER TRUST DEED'S "SUBJECT TO" CLAUSE IN ITS 
JANUARY 2009 JUDGMENT IS IMMATERIAL 
Pioneer is correct in its assertion that the January 2009 Judgment, in reference to the 
Pioneer's various trust deeds' "subject to" clauses, fails to completely cite the "subject to" 
clauses of the various trust deeds and, specifically, fails to cite the final portion of the 
"subject to" clauses which includes the phrase "of record." However, Pioneer correctly cites, 
but mischaracterizes the content of the Trial Court's January 2009 Judgment. 
The 2009 Judgment and Order states, "[Pioneer] obtained its trust deed interests in the 
Property subject to the restrictions appearing in the owners' warranty deed restrictions, 
including making the interests 'subject to all... easements, agreements, memberships, [and] 
leases.'" (paragraph 13.d., R. at 4912) (emphasis added). As is clear from the emphasized 
section above, Pioneer's interests in the Property are subject to the restrictions appearing in 
the owners' warranty deed plain and simple, including any restrictions pertaining to items "of 
record." The clause following the emphasized section, and of which Pioneer complains, is 
not one of exclusivity attempting to nullify provisions of the deeds on which Pioneer's 
interests are subject, but a partial mention of the deeds' "subject to" contents. 
Further, and as stated by Pioneer in its footnote number 4, the Trial Court accurately 
and completely cited the language of "subject to" clause in its Initial Decision, upon which 
the 2009 Judgment and Order was based. This should more than sufficiently clear up any 
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confusion and dispel any thought that the Trial Court was trying to undermine the contents of 
the "subject to" clauses in an apparent attempt to justify its decision, as is implied by Pioneer. 
Finally, the phrase "of record" only applies to the last item in the list (i.e., "rights of 
way of record"). The phrase does not apply to each and every item in the list, as such would 
be illogical because items on the list, such as canals and memberships, are often not interests 
that are made "of record." 
Regardless, the omission by the Trial Court of the "of record" portion of the "subject 
to" clauses is immaterial. The 2009 Judgment sufficiently provides that Pioneer obtained its 
trust deed interests in the Property subject to the owner's warranty deed restrictions (without 
placing limitations on said warranty deed restrictions) which does include the phrase "of 
record." This is not an issue that is of dispute by any party or by the Trial Court, and further 
such omission in the 2009 Judgment has no import as to the issues before this Court. 
V. WHETHER PIONEER EFFECTIVELY ENCUMBERED PARCEL -025 AS OF 
AUGUST 14, 2001, OR A LATER DATE, IS INAPPLICABLE TO AND 
IRRELEVANT TO THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT 
GRANTED THE ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Because every Andersen Defendant, as defined herein, acquired their interest in and to 
the Property before the First Pioneer Trust Deed was recorded on November 17, 2000, and 
before Pioneer recorded its Modified Trust Deed on August 14, 2001 (the date on which 
Pioneer argues it effectively encumbered Parcel -025), the Trial Court's determination of the 
legal effect of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, the 
Corrective Affidavit, and the Settlement Deed, and the date upon which these documents 
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effectively encumbered Parcel -025, are irrelevant and inapplicable to the Trial Court's 
summary judgment in favor of the Andersen Defendants. 
The Charts attached as Addendum, Tab 3 and Addendum, Tab 4, show each Andersen 
Defendant, each lot number they have an interest in, and their original dates of purchase. The 
information in these charts is undisputed and shows that each and every Andersen Defendant 
acquired their interest in the Property prior to Pioneer's recording of the First Pioneer Trust 
Deed on November 17,2000, and prior to Pioneer's recording of the Amended Pioneer Trust 
Deeds on August 14, 2001 attempting to include Parcel -025. 
The Trial Court based the Andersen Defendants' priority, in part, on this fact, and on 
the fact that Pioneer was on actual notice, constructive record notice, and constructive inquiry 
notice, as of the dates it recorded the Pioneer Trust Deeds. Regarding inquiry notice, and as 
stated by the Trial Court, "[Pioneer] knew of improvements on the Property and was on 
inquiry notice up until [Pioneer] filed its trust deed in August of 2001... [Ultimately 
[Pioneer] was on inquiry notice at least from the time of its April 2001 visit up until it filed 
its trust deed." Initial Decision, R. at 4382 (emphasis added). All Andersen Defendants 
having interests in Parcel -025 acquired their interests in Parcel -025 prior to the August 2001 
recording of the Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds. Therefore, whether or not Pioneer 
13 This issue, and the discussion of this issue in the Trial Court's Initial Decision, is focused 
on and applicable to some or all of the Budd Defendants and those Defendants labeled as 
"Group B Defendants" in the Trial Court's Initial Decision. This issue may also be 
applicable to some of the Andersen Defendants in the event this Court does not uphold the 
reasoning behind the Trial Court's Initial Decision relating to the Andersen Defendants. 
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effectively encumbered Parcel -025 as of August 14,2001, or a later date, is of no import to 
the Andersen Defendants given the Trial Court's decision.14 
VI. PIONEER WAS ON RECORD NOTICE OF MANY OF THE ANDERSEN 
DEFENDANTS' INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO ITS FILING 
OF THE CORRECTIVE AFFIDAVIT AND SETTLEMENT QUIT CLAIM 
DEED 
Although the Trial Court granted the Andersen Defendants summary judgment 
without giving regard to the date Pioneer effectively encumbered Parcel -025, if this Court 
agrees with the Trial Court and finds in favor of the Budd Defendants, many of the Andersen 
Defendants would prevail on the same alternative basis. 
On September 24, 2002, Lauren Nalder, a title company employee, attempted to 
retroactively add Parcel -025 to a previously filed warranty deed between KDA, grantor, and 
Pine Ridge, grantee, by Affidavit ("Nalder Affidavit"). This attempt was necessary because 
Pioneer took a trust deed on Parcel -025 from Pine Ridge in 2001, but at that time, Pine 
Ridge was not record owner of Parcel -025, and thus could not transfer an interest in Parcel 
-025 to Pioneer. The Trial Court determined that the Nalder Affidavit was a nullity and did 
not establish priority for Pioneer in Parcel -025 relating back to the date of filing the 
Amended Pioneer Trust Deeds. (See 2009 Judgment at 9, R, at 4912 ("The Nalder Affidavit 
... is a nullity, is not retroactive, and does not meet the requirements of § 57-3-106(8) 
UCA").) Because the Nalder Affidavit was deemed a nullity, Pine Ridge did not obtain 
14 The Andersen Defendants, for the reasons stated in its Andersen Defendants' Summary 
Judgment Reply Memorandum, are of the position that Parcel -025 was not validly conveyed 
to Pioneer until 2005, and therefore, any Andersen Defendant having an interest in Parcel 
-025 who recorded their interest prior to 2005, has another basis to succeed on constructive 
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record title to Parcel -025 until the Settlement Deed was recorded on March 14, 2005, and 
likewise, Pioneer did not obtain an interest in Parcel -025 until said date. 
Attached hereto as Addendum, Tab 7 is a table showing each Andersen Defendant 
who recorded its interest in the Property prior to the date Pioneer effectively encumbered 
Parcel -025 (March 14, 2005). Because these Andersen Defendants recorded prior to 
Pioneer's encumbrance of Parcel -025, Pioneer was on constructive record notice of the 
interests, and Pioneer's interests in Parcel -025 should be subordinate to any such Andersen 
Defendant interests (insofar as they are on Parcel -025) recorded prior to March 14, 2005. 
VII. BECAUSE NONE OF THE ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS ARE CLAIMANTS 
TO "PAYMENT LOTS" OR "PAYMENT DEFENDANTS," PIONEER'S 
ISSUE RELATING TO THE PAYMENT LOTS IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE 
ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS 
In responding to a Proposed Order, Pioneer objected to, and the Trial Court took under 
advisement, the paragraphs and provisions of the Proposed Order that established, or 
purported to establish, any priority of the claimed interests of Lot Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, and 49 
("Payment Lots"), due to Pioneer's contentions that the owners/interest holders of these lots 
("Payment Defendants") had failed to pay in full on his and/or her property in contravention 
of their express agreements. See March 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision, R. at 4779. 
However, because this issue was never raised with respect to any Andersen Defendant and no 
Andersen Defendant has any claims to the above-cited lot numbers, this issue is inapplicable 
to the Andersen Defendants, and should not preclude summary judgment in their favor. 
record notice theory. See Argument VI. 
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VIII. THE ANDERSEN DEFENDANTS OFFERED EVIDENCE OF PIONEER'S 
TITLE INSURANCE POLICY AS EVIDENCE THAT PIONEER HAD 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RECORDED LEASES 
This Court should not reverse the Trial Court's Decision based on the fact it was 
brought to light at the Trial Court level that Pioneer had a title insurance policy that it 
admittedly obtained. The Andersen Defendants referenced Pioneer's title insurance policy 
not to show an alternative source of payment for damages, but rather to show that Pioneer did 
have constructive notice of the recorded leases as reflected in the title commitment. See 
Andersen Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum, R. at 3650. The purpose for 
which the title commitment is referenced by the Andersen Defendants is knowledge. Thus, 
Pioneer has completely misapplied the collateral source rule and, further, Pioneer will suffer 
no prejudice from the inclusion of this reference, as the reference made to the title 
commitment by the Andersen Defendants at the Trial Court level makes no suggestion that 
any insurance company should or will be available to indemnify Pioneer for any losses. 
IX. PIONEER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND COSTS INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL 
Pioneer argues it is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal via 
provisions located in the promissory notes for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security. 
However, none of the Andersen Defendants were parties to the referenced promissory notes 
and/or trust deeds, nor otherwise in privity of contract with Pioneer, and therefore are not 
subject to the provisions of the promissory notes and/or trust deeds. There is no contractual 
basis between Pioneer and the Andersen Defendants for an award of attorneys' fees, and 
Pioneer has not provided a statute entitling them to attorneys' fees. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 
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33, [^46 ("[i]n Utah, attorney fees are typically awarded only pursuant to statute or contract"). 
Pioneer is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees or costs incurred on this appeal from the 
Andersen Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, this Court should uphold the Trial Court's order of summary 
judgment in favor of the Andersen Defendants. The Trial Court correctly determined that the 
Andersen Defendants' interests in the Property, and in each of the Andersen Defendants' 
respective Lots, are superior to and of higher priority than Pioneer's interests in the Property. 
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's judgment. 
DATED this ?& day of July, 2011 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
irfuLi? d«^ 
Miles P. Jensen ^ / 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
(Andersen Defendants) 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
Representative Leases, Right of Way Grants, and Purchase Contract 
(See also R. at 3269-3441 for the remaining Anderson Defendants' documents) 
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THE K.DA CORPORATION 
SUNRISE VILLAGE I! R.V. PARK 
BEAR LAKE 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
LEASE 
The K.DA CORPORATION of Logan, Utah. County of Cache. State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the 
Lessor, hereby leases to DALE RIDD AND/OR MARTA RIDD, State of UTAH hereinafter referred to as the 
Lessee on that certain site located on SUNRISE VILLAGE II R.V. PARK, SITE NUMBER 2 and more 
particularly described as follows, to wit: 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
This lease is for a period of 50 years from 11/1/98 thru 11 /1 /2048. 
Lessee will recognize other Lessees rights and agrees not to do anything to adversely affect them. 
Said Lease is also subject to the following: 1) Articles of incorporation of SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 2) By-Laws SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS ASSOCIATION, INC, 3) Regulations of 
SUNRISE VILLAGE RECREATIONAL VILLAGE PARK 4) Ail other regulations that may come forth by 
virtue of the powers stipulated in the above mentioned documents 5) Lease Agreement 
Site to be cut in as owners needs require, water and power to be installed by developers. 
Grantee: DALE RIDD AND/OR MARTA RIDD 
Address: P.O. BOX 901480 SANDY, UT 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY AS AN ACCOMMODATION ONLY, 
WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO TITLE OR ITS LEGAL EFFECT. 
Dated; 11/1/98 K.D.A. COFtPORATION 
BY: hjjj^2£^^^^ 
ALfSOim BODILY, PRESIDENT State of Utah } fSON H. J 
County of Cache } ss. 
On the 1st day of November, 1998, personally appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who 
being duly sworn did say, that he, the said ALISON H. BODILY is the PRESIDENT of K.DA 
CORPORATION, and that the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its boacqj of directors and said ALISON K BODILY duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the samp and that the seal affixed is the sea! 
of said corporation. I A \ 
" ^ P S T - ^ - ^jmifm ou-u. 60619 
s S o S 2 ' ftaJijjSLlWwLAinwfl^ 
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PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 
EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH 
ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, 
RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS 
AND UTILITIES OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE SITE. 
SAID SITE 2 BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 13 FEET AND WEST 413.56 FEET FROM THE 
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY AS 
RECORDED IN THE RICH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4/71 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 
702, SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 (BY RECORD) AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 47*52'40" EAST 96.20 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 85*39'38" WEST 
83.66 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23*23,01" WEST 62.21 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 88*18' 06" 
EAST 36.78 FEET TO THE POINT OFBEGINNING. 
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THE K.D.A. CORPORATION 
SUNRISE VILLAGE II R.V. PARK 
BEAR LAKE 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE" 
LEASE 
The K.DA CORPORATION of Logan, Utah, County of Cache, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the 
Lessor, hereby leases to DALE RIDD AND/OR MARTA RIDD, State of UTAH hereinafter referred to as the 
Lessee on that certain site located on SUNRISE VILLAGE II R.V. PARK, SffE NUMBER 2 and more 
particularly described as follows, to wit 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
This lease is for a period of 50 years from 11/1/2048 thru 11/1/2098. 
Lessee will recognize other Lessees rights and agrees not to do anything to adversely affect them. 
Said Lease is also subject to the following: 1) Articles of incorporation of SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 2) By-Laws SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 3) Regulations of 
SUNRISE VILLAGE RECREATIONAL VILLAGE PARK 4) All other regulations that may come forth by 
virtue of the powers stipulated in the above mentioned documents 5) Lease Agreement. 
Site to be cut in as owners needs require, water and power to be installed by developers. 
Grantee: DALE RIDD AND/OR MARTA RIDD 
Address: P.O. BOX 901480 SANDY, UT 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY AS AN ACCOMMODATION ONLY, 
WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO TITLE OR ITS LEGAL EFFECT. 
Dated: 11/1/98 K.D.A. CORPORATION 
BY:„ j [ l j^^ L\ 
State of Utah } ALISON H. BODILY, PRESIDENT J 
County of Cache } s s . 
On the 1st day of November, 1996, persona}?/ appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who 
being duly sworn did say, that he, the said ALISON H. BODILY is the PRESIDENT of FCDA 
CORPORATION, and that the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said ALISON H BODILY duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executedThe same and that the seal affixed is the seal 
of safd corporation. , A / c ~ . / 
„ _ \~JNmQ&hq-^-
a** mm mas « « mat «*% *rrrr -^^
 tmm ^ ^ ^ ^ — t » • y r y if < | f T *€[' •• 
• y £ 3 3 ^ Notafy Public " 1 ^Np ta ry Public 
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PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 
EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH 
ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, 
RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS 
AND UTILITIES OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE SITE. 
SAID SITE 2 BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 13 FEET AND WEST 413.56 FEET FROM THE 
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY AS 
RECORDED IN THE RICH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4/71 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 
702, SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 (BY RECORD) AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 47*52'40" EAST 96.20 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 85*39'38" WEST 
83.66 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23*23'01" WEST 62.21 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 88*18' 06" 
EAST 36.78 FEET TO THE POINT OFBEGINNING. 
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THE KLD.A. CORPORATION 
SUNRISE VILLAGE H R.V. PARK 
BEAR LAKE 
RIGHT OF WAY GRANT DEED 
KD.A. CORPORATION, grantor hereby grants a perpetual right of way to DALE RIDD AND/OR 
MARTA RIDD, grantee, for Ingress and egress to an existing SUNRISE VILLAGE RV. PARK as 
located within the boundaries of Rich County, Utah, for a period of 50 years from the date of this 
document from 11/1/98 to 11/1/2048. 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
Said right of way shall extend across grantors land and shall connect to the state highway. 
Said right of way shall also include the right to use and maintain utilities as they are available. 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY AS AN ACCOMMODATION ONLY, 
WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO TITLE OR ITS LEGAL EFFECT. 
Dated: 11/1/98 K.D.A. CORPORATION 
BY: rx&^^^s^/^ 
ALISON H. BODILY, PRESIDENTJ 
State of Utah } 
County of Cache }ss. 
On the 1st day of November, 1998, personally appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who 
being duly sworn did say, that she, the said ALISON K BODILY is the PRESIDENT of KLD.A. 
CORPORATION, and thai the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said ALISON H. BODILY duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the sea! affixed is the seal 
of said corporation. f ''\ 
A U A X / 
00 Notary Public 
gg£- ^ S P » » * tmmrr..rrr w 
Notary Public 
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PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 
EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH 
ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, 
RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS 
AND UTIUTIES OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE SITE. 
SAID SITE 2 BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 13 FEET AND WEST 413.56 FEET FROM THE 
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY AS 
RECORDED IN THE RICH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4/71 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 
702, SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 (BY RECORD) AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 47*52'40" EAST 96.20 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 85*39'38" WEST 
83.66 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23*23'01" WEST 62.21 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 88*18' 06" 
EAST 36.78 FEET TO THE POINT OFBEGINNING. 
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THE K.D.A. CORPORATION 
SUNRISE VILLAGE II R.V. PARK 
BEAR LAKE 
RIGHT OF WAY GRANT DEED 
K.D A CORPORATION, grantor hereby grants a perpetual right of way to DALE R!DD AND/OR 
MARTA RIDD, grantee, for ingress and egress to an existing SUNRISE VILLAGE RV. PARK as 
located within the boundaries of Rich County, Utah, for a period of 50 years from the date of this 
document from 11/1/2048 to 11/1/2098. 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
Said right of way shall extend across grantors land and shall connect to the state highway. 
Said right of way shall also include the right to use and maintain utilities as they are available. 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY AS AN ACCOMMODATION ONLY, 
WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO TITLE OR ITS LEGAL EFFECT. 
Dated: 11/1/98 K.D.A, CORPORATION 
BY: D J . I J P ^ ' J T ^ 
ALISON H. BODILY, PRESIDENT 1 
State of Utah } 
County of Cache } ss. 
On the 1st day of November, 1998, personally appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who 
being duly sworn did say, that she, the sajd ALISON H. BODILY is the PRESIDENT of K.D.A. 
CORPORATION, and that the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said ALISON H. BODILY duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed,the same and that the seal affixed is the seal 
of said corporation. / 
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PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 
EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH 
ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, 
RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS 
AND UTILITIES OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE SITE. 
SAID SITE 2 BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 13 FEET AND WEST 413.56 FEET FROM THE 
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY AS 
RECORDED IN THE RICH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4771 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 
702, SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 (BY REECORD) AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 47*52'40" EAST 96.20 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 85*39'38" WEST 
83.66 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23*23'01" WEST 62.21 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 88*18' 06" 
EAST 36.78 FEET TO THE POINT OFBEGINNING. 
049 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS CONTRACT is made and entered into this 
II 
Sunrise Wage, R.V ftrk 
£>C>yna,\ "KDACorporation.. 
CORP., a Utah corporation herBinafterreferred to as the "Seller," and 
whose address is 
, by and between K D A 
hereinafter referred to aa "Buyer" 
(Note; Whenever used herein, the singular shall include the plural, and the use of gender shafl include both genders as the context may require.) 
In consideration of the mutual terms, covenants, and conditions contained herein, the parties hereto do harby agree as follows: 
1. SALE. Seflef herby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to lease from Seller an R.V. site in SUNRISE VILLAGE, a recreational vehicle 
park located in Rich County, Utah, subject to the terms, covenants, and conditions of this contract 
2. PRICE The purchase price for the site shall be the sum of .T/mA< 
following conditions: 





Initial cash deposit on 
Additional cash deposit on 
Other: 7 z: 
, S,/£.*<3Q4fr*go 
. $ 
Tt;.j r«iV^gi^^fJT^^^i^iai«-.riorjy«4l!^*-c>^Pa "s p^atta to^&sr vvftii inte/asl Lhsrso 
installments of 1/ towards both the principal and Interest with the first monthly-pa 
payments due on ifra same day of each and every month thereafter for a term of £s 
ft) " " " 
<2) 
the rate of 10 per ^ 
lent begin due on 
n! papyear ir. ritc>uifriy 
. and subsequent 
(3) 
until paid in full and subject to the following: 
Buyer snail have the right of prepayment in whole or in part at any time without penalty. 
Each payment made by Buyer snail be applied first to interest accruing to the data of payment and the balance to the reduction of the 
principal balance. Payments made in advance or in excess of the regular monthly payments shal not be applied as or in fieu of future 
regular instaHments unless specifically sa designated In writing by the Buyer at the time of payment 
Payments made to the K D A Corporation, 215 North 400 East, Logan, Utah 84321 
A, Cash Price 
B, Legs.Ca3h.Powp PaymgnUg) r-^ "•+— p. Leg&wagn uw i i raymgnnaj. 
W '//z* H C. Unsaid Balance, of Cash Prisa (Amount Financed) 
_ J / ' C c ^ &,PtoHnitnc8Cji9P3g 
Purchase Price ? / £ , (30 C+,QO Disclosure Statement 
7£*» ernfi .,» Qgl j*#* 
6. Total of Payment {Line CrrftisD) .„ -TLWP,. - L&-) lCO° YcT/fffS? 
F. Deferred Payment Price {Line A ofais 01 As ^ . / , Pg g ( plu D) 
G. Anpual Percentage Rate 3Z2I 
3. DEVELOPMENT. It is understood and agreed that Setter shall develop a recreational vehicle park to be known as SUNRISE VILLAGE II with 55 
recreational vehicle sites - these are private sites. 
4. TRANSFERABILITY. Site if transferable but not without the prior written consent of the Seller and such consent shafl not be unreasonably withheld; 
providod, however, that no transfer can be made unless and until all contractual obligations hereunder have bean fulfilled to the date of the transfer and 
that evidence » submitted to Seller establishing the credit status of the transferee to be acceptable. 
5. ASSOCIATION OR MEMBERS. Buyer shall be required and entitled to become a member of SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., 
an incorporated non-profit association organized tor the purpose of managing the affairs of the members of the park; and Buyer agrees to be bound by 
the articles of incorporation, by-laws, and/or regulations of said Association and acknowledges that said Association shall have the right and authority to 
assess members a proportionate share of costs and expenses Incurred by it and It shall have the right to place liens against the membership of the 
duye'r lor"such assessments. 
6. REGULATIONS. Buyer agrees that the site acquired hereunder is subject to the regulations attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; that he Is bound by such 
regulations;jaati that if Buyer is in violation of any of said regulation, SeBer may, at its option, upon Buyer's failure or refusal to cease such violation, 
requejy B/0^r to leave the premises and in addition there to suspend Buyenj membership and all rights and privileges thereof for a period not to exceed 
_ days for such violation. 
f BU VEER'S DEFAULT. In the event of the failure of Buyer to comply with the terms of this contract or upon the failure of the Buyer to make any 
paymen/or payments when the same shall become due hereunder, whether principal, interest, or otherwise, or within 30 days thereafter, time being the 
essence of this contract, then Seller, at its option and in addition to any and all remedies available in law or equity. shaH have the following alternative 
remedies 
(a) Seller shal have the right, upon the failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five (5) days after written notice of the default and Sellers' 
intent to declare a forfeiture, or the elect another remedy for default to be released from all obligation to convey a membership to Buyer, and all payments 
which have been made to it by Buyer shaB be forfeited to Seller as liquidated damages tor the non-performance of this contract and in consideration for 
the execution of this contract; and Seller may, at its option ..thereupon terminate the membership of Ihe Buyer without legal proceeding. 
(b) Seller may bring suit to recover judgment tot any and all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's fees. The exercise of this action 
on one or more occasions shall not prevent Seller, at its option, from exercising other remedies available to it hereunder in the event of a subsequent 
default of Buyer; or Seller may declare the entire unpaid principal balance remaining due and payable at once together with any interest thereon or other 
obligations accruing hereunder and bring suit to recover such sums and any costs including attorney's fees. 
8. SELLER'S DEFAULT. If Seller refuses or fais to perform the terms of this contract, aB deposits shaK be returned to buyer upon demand, and Buyer 
shall not thereby waive any remedy available at law or in equity because of such default 
9. COSTS. Any party failing to perform this contract shall pay all expenses incurred, including attorney's fees, by the other party as the result ol such 
Jlure. 
10. FULL AGRESmcNT. No agreement uniess incorporated herein shall be binding upon the parties. Buyer acknowledges that he has inspected the 
premises and all pertinent documents before executing this contract and that he has the right to seek legal advice before doing sa 
11. CONTINUITY. The terms, conditions and covenants contained herein shall bind and the benefits hereof insure to the parties and their heirs, 
assigns, personal representatives, and successors in interest. 
UTAH CGD£ AriMOTATED DcCTJONS 37-13-12 PROVIDES; "FJnCHASEfi ! i RJGHTTO CANCEL:YOU fciAY CArtCELTHJS AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT ANY CANCELLATION FEE OR OTHER PENALTY BY HAND DELIVERING OR SENDING BY CERTIFIED MAIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF 
CANCELATION TO: (NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEVELOPER). THE NOTICE MUST BY OELIVERED OR POST MARKED BY MIDNIGHT OF THE 
RFTH CALENDAR DAY FOLLOWING THE DAY ON WHICH THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. IN COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF CALENDAR DAYS, 
THE DAY ON WHICH THE CONTRACT IS SIGNED AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS ARE NOT INCLUDED." 
-Q& • 
I r ydayof_ 
gned and dated this _ ,*27 
K D A CORPORATION 
QjiXi^J $6Cfr,eo * 
u 
r i/cXrtL,,.; a 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
Affidavit of Layne J. Smith 
(with Exhibits Showing Locations of Parcels -025 and Parcels -036) 
{See also R. at 4784-4797, Exhibits in Packet No. 4798) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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GaryN. Anderson, #0088 
Brian G. Cannell, #7477 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
595 South Riverwoods Parkway, Suite 100 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435) 752-2610 
Robert J. Dale, #0808 
Bradley L. Tilt, #7649 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Street Address: ' 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mailing Address: 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801) 596-2814 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF 
NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation a/k/a 
PIONEER BUILDERS OF NEVADA, a 
Nevada corporation a/k/a PIONEER 
BUILDERS, a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
K D A CORPORATION, a Utah corporation 
a/k/a KDA CORPORATION a/k/a K.D.A. 
CORPORATION a/k/a THE K.D.A. 
CORPORATION a/k/a K.D.A. 
CORPORATION, INC.; et al, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAYNE J. SMITH 
Civil no. 03010042iLM 
(and 030100033, consolidated) 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
4839-9468-1090 
I 
l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
I, LAYNE J. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21, and am fully competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
2. I am a Professional Land Surveyor licensed by the State of Utah, and have been 
since 1998. 
3. I am employed as a Professional Land Surveyor with Skyline A/E/S, Inc., a/k/a 
Skyline Architecture/Engineering/Surveying. 
4. I have performed more than 100 surveys in Rich County, Utah, and many more in 
counties other than Rich County, Utah. 
5. I have conducted a survey to confirm the location of the lots commonly known 
and referred to as site or Lot nos. 49, 50, 51, and the "Honeymoon Lot" of the Sunrise Village 
RV Park located in Rich County, State of Utah, including ultimately creating a survey map 
relating to the location of those lots. A copy of the survey map I created (the "Smith Survey 
Map") is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
6. As a part of my survey and creation of the Smith Survey Map, I reviewed various 
documents, including without limitation as stated and identified in the survey narrative located in 
the top left-hand corner of the Smith Survey Map. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of a document I reviewed in performing 
my survey and creating the Smith Survey Map, and which is referred to in the survey narrative 
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portion of the Smith Survey Map as the "map created of Sunrise Village and in use by the owners 
organization." 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a copy of a document I reviewed in performing 
my survey and creating the Smith Survey Map, and which is referred to in the survey narrative 
portion of the Smith Survey Map as "another map which has been recorded in the county 
recorder's office created of Sunrise Village and in use by the owners organization." 
9. Attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "D" are copies of documents I reviewed in 
performing my survey and creating the Smith Survey Map from which I obtained the legal 
descriptions for lots or sites 48 and 51. 
10. Also as a part of my survey I personally viewed and inspected the properties in 
Rich County, Utah bearing tax identification numbers 41-08-00-036,41-08-00-037, 41-08-00-
038, and 41-08-00-025, and I supervised and oversaw a team of field technicians taking and 
making measurements on the ground. 
11. Based upon all of the items discussed above and in the survey narrative portion of 
the Smith Survey Map, all of which items are ordinarily and customarily relied upon by 
Professional Land Surveyors, I was able to retrace the description of the property bearing Rich 
County tax identification number 41-08-00-036 ("Parcel -036") and the description of the 
property bearing Rich County tax identification number 41-08-00-025 ("Parcel -025"), and I was 
able to plot the location on the ground of Parcel -036 and Parcel -025. 
12. Also based upon all of the items discussed above and in the survey narrative 
portion of the Smith Survey Map, I was able to retrace and plot the location on the ground of site 
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or Lot nos. 49, 50, and 51 of the Sunrise Village RV park. 
13. It is my opinion and conclusion, as shown and reflected on the Smith Survey Map, 
that Lot nos. 49, 50, and 51 of the Sunrise Village RV Park are located on Parcel -036. Without 
limitation of any kind upon the foregoing, it is my opinion and conclusion, as shown and 
reflected on the Smith Survey Map, that Lot nos. 49, 50, and 51 of the Sunrise Village RV Park 
are not located within Parcel -025. 
14. Based upon information presently available to me, I am unable to reach a 
conclusion as to the location of the "Honeymoon Lot." 
DATED thisZl^day of July, 2008. 
j ^ ^ 
Layne J. Smith 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this <P»/ day of July, 2008, by Layne 
J. Smith. 
'NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: * U>Gk7.ft tJT 
My Commission Expires: 
- - « ELAINE J. COVERT 
&03t&x$k fSQTARY PUBLIC * STATE OFifXAti 
elllsiS~ l26 SOOTH SOOSW ~ 
y$Z?3w LOGAN, UT 8432! 
^££S My Comm. Exp, 11/25/2009 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
LAYNE J. SMITH was mailed by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, this J.I ""day of July, 
2008, to each of the following: 
Robert J. Dale 
Bradley L. Tilt 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Plaintiff' 
N. George Daines 
Kevin K. Allen 
Jonathan E. Jenkins 
DAINES, WYATT & ALLEN, LLP 
108 North Main Street 
Logan, UT 84321 
Attorneys for KDA Corporation 
Mark J. Williams 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Steven G. Baugh, RE/MAX in the Valley, 
and RE/MAX West 
D. Jason Hawkins 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 4500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Advanced Title Insurance Agency, L. C. 
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Stuart H. Schultz, Esq. 
Byron G. Martin 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Attorneys for Thor B. Roundy, P. C. and Thor Roundy 
Brent K. Wamsley 
Wamsley & Associates, L.C. 
4360 South Redwood Road, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-2204 
Attorneys for Boyd Smith and Carolyn Smith 
Miles P. Jensen 
Kevin J. Fife 
Olson & Hoggan, P.C. 
130 South Main, Suite 200 
PO Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Lynn G Andersen, Larry H. Anderson, Bill 
Breinholt, Shawna Breinholt, Donna L. Elmquist, William R. 
Glaser, Laurie A. Glaser, Lenard Hanzlick, Kathryn J. Hanzlick, 
Harold J. Kay, Glade Larsen, Coralie Larsen, Gregory Larsen, 
Jerilyn Larsen, Nictree Limited Partnership, Richard Roberts, 
Carol Roberts, Marcel J. Schwager, Sandra S. Schwager, John 
D. Smidt as Trustee, Linda L. Smidt as Trustee, Dorothy 
Steadman, Sunrise Village Members' Association, Inc., Clint 
Thompson, Carolyn Thompson, Dale Ridd, Marta Ridd, Timothy 
J. Kendell, and Scott Hayes 
Joseph M. Chambers 
Harris, Preston & Chambers, PC 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Michael Budd and Trudi Budd, Larry Call and Karen 
Call, Robert Gonzales and Sheri Gonzales, Daniel Hunter, Estate of 
Randall Hunter, Ronald Hunter, Kay Hunter, Shyreal D. Jensen and 
Inge L. Jensen, Brent Rhees, Estate of Ginger Rhees, and Harlan and 
Renae Taylor 
(Jff^ X^A-
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^ — ' SUNRISE VILLAGE R.V. PARK 
I! 
BEAR LAKE 
-THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
LEASE 
The K.D.A. CORPORATION of Logan, Utah, County of Cache, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
the Lessor, hereby leases to JOHN C. ROMERO AND BARBARA Y. ROMERO; HAROLD MCGRATtf 
AND JANICE MCGRATfl; NORMAN BATT AND DEBRALEE BATT, State of UTAH hereinafter referred to 
as the Lessee on that certain site located on SUNRISE VILLAGE R.V. PARK, SITE NUMBER 48 and 
more particularly described as follows, to wit: 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
This lease is for a period of 50 years from September 1, 1996 thru September 1, 2046. 
Lessee will recognize other Lessees rights and agrees not to do anything to adversely affect them. 
Said Lease is also subject to the following: 1} Articles of incorporation of SUNRISE VILLAGE 
MEMBERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 2) By-Laws SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 3) 
Regulations of SUNRISE VILLAGE RECREATIONAL VILLAGE PARK 4) All other regulations that may 
come forth by virtue of the powers stipulated in the above mentioned documents 5) Lease 
Agreement. 
Site to be cut in as owners needs require, water and power to be installed by developers. 
Grantee: JOHN C. ROMERO AND BARBARA Y. ROMERO 
8713 Oakwood Park Circle, Sandy, UT 84094 
HAROLD MCGRATtf AND JANICE MCGRATtf 
5075 South Clovavtew Drive, Murray, UT 84123 
NORMAN BATT AND DEBRALEE BATT 
6157 South 4390 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
Dated: September 1, 1996 K.D.A. CORPORATION 
BY: j \ W ^ S ^ t 
ALISON H. BODILY, PRESIDENT T 
State of Utah } 
County of Cache ] ss. 
On the U day of September, 1996, personally appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who being 
duly sworn did say, that he, the said ALISON H. BODILY is the PRESIDENT of K.D.A. CORPORATION, 
and that the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a 
resolution of its board of directors and said ALISON H. BODILY duly acknowledged to rne that said 
corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the^eal of said corporation. 
M^^/j^KV 
-. r • li1 \':: H l ' 'J---;Vi; I ' /) /) Notary Public 
• •If ••-:. I (.(.Kit:.' ii i l l r i i l IS (S * 
'••.•:«.N. U| kU-C!t ( 
v^ r/.;;.t uw rL^ if.•« id j 
~ '.'-'"4.59 
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PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 
EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH 
ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, 
RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS 
AND UTILITIES OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE 
SITE. 
SAID Snp£8JBEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS (REVISED): 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 597.235 FEET AND WEST 1232.197 FEET FROM 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY 
AS RECORDED IN THE RICH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4/71 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 
702 SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 (BY RECORD) AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 6*43*01" EAST 32.92 FEET; THENCE NORTH 58 #54'49" EAST 
52 08 FEET; THENCE NORTH 9M4'54" EAST 55.34 FEET; THENCE NORTH 74M8 '54" 
WEST 10 88 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 75M 9' 18" WEST 92.75 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
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i 2 Q _ / | | f P M I n B o ^ ^ THE K.D.A. CORPORATION 
SOj)CuKLAaie».R^ VILLAGE II R.V. PARK 
^£mL2^^^—.-
" ^ ' BEAR LAKE 
"THIS 15 A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADV'.CE." 
LEASE 
The K.D.A. CORPORATION of Logan, Utah, County of Cache, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to 
as the Lessor, hereby k-e-sw to BRENT RHEES AMD GINGER RHEES, State of Utah hereinafter 
referredto_5s'the lessee en that certain site located m S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i S s B l ^ ^ 
S S 0 T ^ i S 2 5 S B d more particularly described as follows, to wit: " " ^ 
See attached for the legal description which by this reference is made a part hereof. 
This lease is for a period ol 50 years from December 5, 2000 to December 5, 2050. 
Lessee* will recognise r.trw Lessees rights and agrees not to do anything to adversely affect them. 
Said Lease is also subject to the following: 1) Articles of incorporation of SUNRISE VILLAGE 
MEMBERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 2) By-Laws SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS ASSOCIATION. INC. 2) 
Regulations of SUNRISE VILLAGE RECREATIONAL VILLAGE PARK 4) All other regulations that 
may come forth by virtue of the powers stipulated in the above mentioned documents 5j Least) 
Agreement. 
Site to he i;ui m a^ owners needs require, water and power to be installed by developers. -
Gfar-cse: BRENT RHEE3 AND GINGER RHEES 
Ad;rt*:;s: 3772 NORTH 3900 WEST PLAIN CITY, UT 84404 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY AS AN ACCOMMODATION ONLY, 
WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO TITLE OR ttS LEGAL EFFECT. 
Dated: December 5, 2000 K.D.A. CORPORATION 
State of Utah } ALISON H. BODILY, PRESIDENT 
County of Cache } ss. 
On tne 5tn day of De-.cnmber. 2000. personally appeared before me ALISON H. BODILY who 
being duly sworn did say, that he, the said ALISON H. BODILY is the PRESIDENT of K.D.A. 
CORPORATION, and that the within the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said ALISON H. 
BODILY dulv acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the 
seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. - / * 
v<qE?5>v Salary Puolic T 
DACEIHOGGAN I 0 0 Notary PUDHC 
64 £a$! Confer 
Lagan, uian 8*321 ) 
My Commission Expire*
 f 
February i, 2002 I 
toiylUiah. j 01QS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LEGAL D E S C R I P T I O N 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION B, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST OF THE SALT 
UKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, ALSO BEING LOCATED IN THE NORTH ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SECTION 8, TOWNSHIP 14 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST. 
TOGETHER WITH RIGHT OF USE OF COMMON AREAS AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ACCESS AND UTILITIES 
OVER A 30 FOOT WIDE ROAD WAY FROM THE STATE ROAD TO THE SITE. 
SAID SITESBEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 654.915 FEET AND WEST 972,207 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER Or THE UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATIONS PROPERTY AS RECORDED IN THE RICH 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON 6/4/71 IN BOOK F-2, PAGE 702, SAID POINT BEING NORTH 620.53 FEET 
AND EAST 2617.304 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 
3 (BY RECORD) AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 13*57'04* WEST 80.B3 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8 9 1 8 W 
WESU3.80 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 5*17'30" WEST78.30 FEET; THENCE NORTH 8B*21'54"EAST67.29 FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
Andersen Defendants' Leasehold Interests 










Dale & Marta Ridd 
Marcel & Sandra 
Schwager 
Nictree Ltd. 
Partnership (Miles & 
Sherry Crabtree) 




Trust (John & Linda 
Q m i r l t QC T Y i i c t f ^ c ^ 
L / i i i x v i i c*»j x x v*-ui.w%^uj 
Bill & Shauna 
Brienholt (Successor 












Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Purchase 
Contract 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Purchase 
Contract 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Purchase 
Contract 
Lease, Right of Way 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, 
Recorded Notice of Lease 
Lease, Assignment of 
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(Successor in interest 














Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Purchase 
Contract 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed dated 
October 1,2001 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed, Purchase 
Contract, and Purchase 
Contract and Addendum 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
Andersen Defendants' Undivided Leasehold Interests 









Larry A. Andersen 
Timothy Kendall & 
Scott Hayes 
(Successors in 
interest to Terry 
Behunin) 
Kathryn & Leonard 
Hanzlick 
Dorothy Steadman 
Glade Larsen & 
Richard Roberts 












Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed (11-21-03) 
Quit Claim Deed 
&Transfer of Interest, 
Purchase Contract, 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Purchase Contract, 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Purchase Contract, 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Purchase Contract, 
Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 
Purchase Contract, 
Lease, Right of Way 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
Recorded Leasehold Interests Existing 
Prior To Any Pioneer Trust Deed 












interest to Leonard 
& Joanne Butcher) 
Miles & Sherry 
Crabtree 
Ken & Kay Depew 
Jim & Louise 
Moore 
Claudia Budd 
Gary & Kaye 
Pearce 














Lease, Right of Way 
Grant Deed 





Perpetual Right of 




Contract, Right of 
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ADDENDUM NO. 6 
Property Improvements Made By Andersen Defendants 
See also Affidavits attached to Anderson Defendants' Summary Judgment Reply 
Memorandum 

















Improvements Date Made 
1 Individual power meter unit installed - 1997 
Enlarged parking - Aug. & Sept. 1998 
Altered entrance to pad - Sept. 1998 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1997 
10' x 20' cement pad - Prior to May 29, 2000 
Chipped rock driveway - Prior to May 29, 2000 
Grass- Prior to May 29, 2000 
Underground sprinkler system - Prior to May 29, 2000 
Separate pedestal electric meter - Prior to May 29,2000 
(for water, sewer & electricity) 
Ornamental rocks - Prior to May 29, 2000 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 2000 
Electrical utilities - May 1999 
Concrete pad 30' x 15' - June 8, 1998 
Sprinkling system - May 1999 
Grass, tree and plant landscaping - May 24, 1999 
Driveway & entrance with gravel - June 1998 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since Sept. 1996 
Cement trailer pad and patio - Aug. 1996 
Grass & sprinkler system - Aug. 1996 
Landscaping & gravel for driveway - Sept. & Oct. 1996 
Additional sprinkler system - June 1997 j 
Planted shrubs & flowers — June 1997 i 
Constructed a brick and rock barbeque - July 1997 
Installed a lattice fence - July 1997 
Additional permanent landscaping - Summer of 1998 
Planted pine trees, shrubs and grass - 1999 
Additional gravel to driveway - 2000 
Additional rocks for landscaping - 2000 
Additional sprinklers to system - Before Aug. 2001 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1996 
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4 0 ' x 4 0 ' l a w n - 1998 
Power & sewer outlets - Since 1999 
Sprinkler heads & garden hoses - 1999 








New electrical line & meter - June 2000 
Planted new grass & flowers - July 2000 




16 John Smidt 
as Trustee 
Individual power meter unit - 1991 
Electrical services - 1991 
Concrete p a d - 1994 






Planted lawn- 1990 
Paved & installed 40' x 20' cement pad - 1992 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - 1995 
Ex. 36, 
R. at 
3545 - 3548 
18 Ronald 
Hunter 
Enlarge useable space (fill dirt) -
40' x 16' cement pad paved & installed -
Sprinkler system & planted grass -
Installed cement for a camper pad & fence -
Installed permanent steps for fifth wheel -
Installed trees, shrubs & flowers -
Installed power pole, & gravel driveway -
Installed 10'x 14'shed -
Installed family name sign -
Installed a permanent fence around trees -
Installed metal roof over fifth wheel -
Installed patio cover -
Electrical power -
Installed railroad ties (landscaping) -
Installed cement extension pad (fifth wheel) -
Fifth wheel parked and never moved -
Maintained lot & cleared weeds -
Cleared area/installed gravel base for 2nd trailer -
Hauled in fill dirt & planted grass for 2nd trailer -
Power & sewer installed for 2nd trailer -
Cleared area & installed gravel base for 3rd trailer -
Hauled in fill dirt & planted grass for 3rd trailer -
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Improvements Date Made 
I 15' x 30' concrete pad with retaining blocks - Aug. 28, 1998 
Installed gravel driveway- Sept. 30, 1998 
Topsoil- Oct. 1999 
Installed automatic sprinklers - May 2000 
Installed more retaining blocks - May 2000 
Planted sod and trees - May 2000 
Installed permanent steps - May 2000 
Sprayed top of hill to prevent dust - July 2000 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1998 
Installed 8' x 40' cement pad - Aug. & Sept. 1998 
Installed gravel driveway- Aug. & Sept. 1998 
Installed permanent steps - Aug. 1998 
Installed humming bird feeders - Summer 1998 & 1999 
Installed rocks and railroad ties - Summer 1998 & 1999 
Landscaping- Summer 1998 & 1999 
Planted lawn and Flowers - Summer 1998 & 1999 
Treated hillside to prevent dust - Summer 1998, 1999 
&2000 
Installed clothesline - July 1998 
Yard Maintenance - Since 1998 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1998 
Installed 16' x 64' cement pad - May 1998 
Driveway blacktopped - Aug. 2000 
Installed sprinkler system - 1998 
Planted lawn - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Installed electrical pedestals - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Place railroad ties - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1998 
Leveled & timbered hill with 4' railroad ties - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Installed flower bed with railroad ties - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Installed automatic sprinkler system - Prior to Aug. 2001 
35' x 15' concrete pad - Prior to Aug. 2001 | 
Gravel for driveway - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1998 
Leveled lot/site - 1997 
Installed power, water & sewer hookups - 1997 
Poured concrete for fifth wheel - 1997 
Installed sprinkler system & concrete patios - 1998 
Poured more concrete & planted lawn - 1999 
Planted shrubs - 2000 
Installed rock fire pit & storage shed - 2000 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1996 
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Improvements Date Made 
Installed rock & cinder ground cover - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Installed concrete slab - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Fill dirt & railroad tie retaining wall - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Planted trees & flowers - Prior to Aug. 2001 
Installed power meter - Prior to Aug. 2001 
RV on site continuously - Since May 2000 
' Maintained & cleared weeds - Since 1999 
Installed 40' x 12' cement pad - 1994 
Installed electrical & sewer hookups - 1994 
Leveled ground - May - Sept. 1995 
Landscaping- May-Sept. 1995 
Sprinkler system - May - Sept. 1995 
Planted 12 trees, grass & flowers - May - Sept. 1995 
Lined driveway (rocks & flower beds) - May-Sept. 1995 
4 whiskey barrels ( dirt & flowers) - May - Sept. 1997 
Installed wooden fence - 1999 
20 'x 10'cement pad for shed- 1999 
Built/installed wooden shed with shingle roof- 1999 
Installed electric wire - 1999 
Installed railroad ties - 1999 
Laid gravel- 1999 
Dug fire pit & install rocks around it - 1999 
Planted 3 additional trees & flowers - 2000 
Trailer parked year-round - Since 1998 
Maintained lot & cleared weeds - Since 1994 
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ADDENDUM NO. 7 





































Lease (11/1/1998 to 
11/1/2048) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (11/1/1998 to 
11/1/2048) 
Lease (11/1/2048 to 
11/1/2098) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (11/1/2048 to 
11/1/2098) 
Lease (7/1/2000 to 
7/1/2050) 
Lease (7/1/2050 to 
7/1/2100) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/1/2050 to 
7/1/2100) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/1/2000 to 
7/1/2050) 
Lease (7/1/1998 to 
7/1/2048) 
Lease (7/1/2048 to 
7/1/2098) 
Right of Wray Grant 
Deed (11/1/1998 to 
11/1/2048) 
Right of Way Grant 
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Lease (7/23/1996 to 
7/23/2046) 
Lease (7/23/2046 to 
7/23/2096) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/23/1996 to 
7/23/2046) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/23/2046 to 
7/23/2096) 
Lease (11/21/2003 to 
11/21/2053) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (11/21/2003 to 
11/21/2053) 
Lease (11/21/2053 to 
11/21/2103) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (11/21/2053 to 
11/21/2103) 
Lease (9/1/2000 to 
9/1/2050) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (9/1/2000 to 
9/1/2050) 
Lease (9/1/2050 to 
9/1/2100) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (9/1/2050 to 
9/1/2100) 
j^ease (o/i /zuul IU 
6/1/2051) 
Lease (6/1/2051 to 
6/1/2101) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/1/2001 to 
6/1/2051) 
Right of Way Grant 1 
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Lease (2/6/1995 to 
2/6/2045) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (2/6/1995 to 
2/6/2045) 
Lease (2/6/2045 to 
2/6/2095) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (2/6/2045 to 
2/6/2095) 
Assignment of Lease 
and Right of Way 
Grant Deed) 
Assignment of Lease 
Lease (8/19/1996 to 
8/19/2046) 
Lease (8/19/2046 to 
8/19/2096) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (8/19/1996 to 
8/19/2046) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (8/19/2046 to 
8/19/2096) j 
Notice of Interest i 
(Daniel J. Hunter) 
Notice of Interest 
(Ronald & Kay 
Hunter) 
Notice of Interest 
(Robert & Sheri 
Gonzales and 
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Lease (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Lease (6/10/2053 to 
6/10/2103) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/10/2053 to 
6/10/2103) 
1 Quit Claim Deed and 
Transfer of Interest 
Lease (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Lease (6/10/2053 to 
6/10/2103) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/10/2053 to 
6/10/2103) 
Lease (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (6/10/2003 to 
6/10/2053) 
Lease (6/10/2053 to | 
6/10/2103) 
Right of Way Grant 
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Documents Document Date 
1 Recording Information 
1 Date 
Filing 
| No. 1 Book 1 Page(s) 
no Lease or Right of 
Way Grant Deed 
given 
Lease (7/1/1998 to 
7/1/2048) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/1/1998 to 
7/1/2048) 
Lease (7/1/2048 to 
7/1/2098) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (7/1/2048 to 
7/1/2098) 
Lease (3/12/2003 to 
3/12/2053) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (3/12/2003 to 
3/12/2053) 
Lease (3/12/2053 to 
3/12/2103) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (3/12/2053 to 
3/12/2103) 
Lease (10/1/2001 to 
10/1/2051) 
Right of Way Grant 
Deed (10/1/2001 to 
10/1/2051) 
Lease (10/1/2051 to 
10/1/2101) 
Right of Way Grant 
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